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ABSTRACT
Buffer overflow attacks have been a computer security threat in software-based systems and
applications for decades. The existence of buffer overflow vulnerabilities makes the system
susceptible to Internet worms and denial of service (DDoS) attacks which can cause huge
social and financial impacts.
Due to its importance, buffer overflow problem has been intensively studied. Researchers
have proposed different techniques to defend against unknown buffer overflow attacks. They
have also investigated various solutions, including automatic signature generation, automatic
patch generation, etc., to automatically protect computer systems with known vulnerabili-
ties. The effectiveness and efficiency of the automatic signature generation approaches and
the automatic patch generation approaches are all based on the accurate understanding of
the vulnerabilities, the buffer overflow vulnerability diagnosis (BOVD). Currently, the results
of automatic signature generation and automatic patch generation are far from satisfaction
due to the insufficient research results from the automatic BOVD.
This thesis defines the automatic buffer overflow vulnerability diagnosis (BOVD) problem
and provides solutions towards automatic BOVD for commodity software. It targets on
commodity software when source code and symbol table are not available. The solutions
combine both of the dynamic analysis techniques and static analysis techniques to achieve
the goal.
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Based on the observation that buffer overflow attack happens when the size of the des-
tination buffer is smaller than the total number of writes after the data copy process if the
buffer overflow attack happens through a data copy procedure, the diagnosis results return
the information of the size of destination buffer, the total number of writes of a data copy
procedure and how the user inputs are related with them. They are achieved through bound
analysis, loop analysis and input analysis respectively. We demonstrate the effectiveness of
this thesis approach using real world vulnerable applications including the buffer overflow
vulnerabilities attacked by the record-setting Slammer and Blaster worms.
This thesis also does the complete case study for buffer overflow vulnerabilities which
may have independent interests to researchers. Our buffer overflow case study results can
help other researchers to design more effective defense systems and debugging tools against
buffer overflow attacks.
Keywords: software security, vulnerability diagnosis, vulnerability defense, buffer overflow,
loop analysis, bound checking.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Buffer overflow[73, 38] has become notorious since 1988, when Morris worm, one of the
first significant computer break-ins which took advantage of a buffer overflow vulnerability,
surfaced in software security community. The attacks caused by buffer overflow continue
to be the major computer security threats. As a traditional exploit, buffer overflow allows
attackers to inject malicious codes in the application at run-time. Those injected codes can
help attacker to gain the access privilege of the host machine maliciously.
Even though buffer overflow has been intensively studied and researchers have proposed
various mitigation techniques, it is still the most critical security threat these days. Accord-
ing to the statistics from CERT Coordination Center, the number of identified and cataloged
vulnerabilities has increased over 213% in the last two years (2004-2006) as shown in Fig-
ure 1. Based on Xu’s study [100], buffer overflow vulnerability is still the largest category of
cataloged vulnerabilities. The existence of buffer overflow vulnerabilities makes the system
susceptible to Internet worms and denial of service (DDoS) attacks which can cause huge
social and financial impacts.
Due to its importance, during the last two decades, researchers have proposed various
approaches[22, 30, 59, 81, 86, 62, 23, 58, 78, 43, 93, 92, 37, 36, 91, 11, 47, 20, 18, 21, 31, 48,
67, 68, 56, 42, 58, 78, 43, 100, 28, 15] to defend against buffer overflow attacks. However,
each of them has its own limitations and can’t be applied universally to prevent buffer
overflow attacks. At the same time, researchers have also proposed many attack detection
techniques[90, 72, 39, 76, 100, 88, 28, 102, 15, 22, 30, 59, 81, 86, 62, 23]. Using the above
attack detection tools to monitor a program, an alarm will be raised once a malicious attack
happens.
They have also investigated various solutions, including automatic signature generation,
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Figure 1: The Cataloged Vulnerabilities Data from CERT Coordination Center(CERT/CC)
from 1995 to 2007
automatic patch generation, etc., to automatically protect computer systems with known
vulnerabilities. Exploits of vulnerable programs, including zero-day attacks on previously
unknown vulnerabilities have caused havoc on the Internet and caused billions of dollars
in estimated damage. signature-based input filtering is an effective and widely deployed
mechanism to defend against such attacks. It matches program inputs against a set of
signatures. It has been widely deployed due to its fast response and less intrusion to a
system. Researchers have proposed many different approaches[60, 70, 40, 84, 61, 24, 26, 94,
35, 34]. However, none is satisfiable. Vulnerability-based signature approaches[24, 26, 94,
41, 34] which are believed to be the most effective signature techniques either generate the
signature manually or assume the vulnerability condition is given or can’t handle when the
vulnerability doesn’t happen through the unsafe usage of library functions. Automatic patch
generation [82] applies some simple fix heuristics. The automatic patches generated using
those heuristics are not effective. The effectiveness and efficiency of those approaches are all
based on the accurate understanding of the vulnerabilities, the buffer overflow vulnerability
diagnosis (BOVD). Currently, the results of automatic signature generation and automatic
patch generation are far from satisfaction due to the insufficient research results from the
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automatic BOVD. However, generating the patches and signatures by security engineers is an
error-prone activity requiring heavy investment in time and manpower which may delay the
protection time, e.g. patch generation time. They all motivate the research on automatic
and accurate vulnerability diagnosis.
1.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION
A buffer overflow occurs when a store instruction writes outside the allocated buffer bounds.
In the best case, a buffer overflow results in the program crashing due to an inappropriate
memory dereference. In the worst case, a buffer overflow can be exploited to hijack control
of a program.
When a new buffer overflow vulnerability is first exploited, a primary challenge is to di-
agnose the vulnerability. The expected buffer overflow vulnerability diagnosis results include
1) which buffer was overflowed, and 2) under what conditions the buffer will be overflowed.
The running example demonstrated in Figure 23 is a buffer overflow vulnerable program
motivated by several real world examples. We want to find out that the chunk->data is the
vulnerable buffer, an integer field of a user input can cause the buffer overflow, and buffer
overflow happens when the integer is greater than 36. Currently, this diagnosis process is
done manually by security engineers which is slow, expensive and error prone. Given the
results of automatic vulnerability diagnosis, we can then perform the accurate signature
generation and patch generation automatically and efficiently. How automatic vulnerability
diagnosis can benefit the whole software security research is demonstrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Automatic vulnerability diagnosis in software security research
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Automatic buffer overflow vulnerability diagnosis is important for enabling appropri-
ate security responses to defend against zero-day attacks, such as creating an input filter
(e.g., [24, 26, 94]) that filters out all subsequent exploits for the buffer overflow, and more
effective automatic patch generation [82]. Unfortunately, in such scenarios we do not have
access to the source code: defenses must be prepared from only the vulnerable program bi-
nary and a sample exploit. Such scenarios do not assume access to source code because many
threats develop quickly (e.g., internet worms) and there is no time for an end-user to contact
the vendor: defenses must be prepared immediately. Furthermore, when the application is
legacy application or modern software application which tends to be built on third-party
libraries or when the program segments are written in assembly code directly, the access to
source code is unlikely. Due to all these reasons, we target the vulnerable program on binary
programs.
In the automatic buffer overflow vulnerability diagnosis (BOVD) problem, we are given
a compiled buffer overflow vulnerable program P and a working exploit E. The goal is to
find out where the program is vulnerable, buffer overflow vulnerability point (BOVP) and
why the program is vulnerable, buffer overflow vulnerability condition (BOVC).
The buffer overflow attack occurs by overwriting some critical data, for example, return
address, function pointers, etc. We use the instruction that does the malicious write to
pinpoint the vulnerability location of the given vulnerable program, which is the BOVP.
Based on the observation that buffer overflow attack happens when the size of the des-
tination buffer is smaller than the total number of writes after the data copy process if the
buffer overflow attack happens through a data copy procedure, the BOVC contains the des-
tination buffer size information, the total number of writes information and how the user
inputs are related with them.
1.2 CHALLENGES.
Even though buffer overflow problem has been intensively studied and researchers have pro-
posed various mitigation tools during the last few decades, the buffer overflow vulnerability
4
diagnosis is still an open problem.
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) has proposed Gray Box testing
technique[1] to prevent stack buffer overflows. It searches for calls to insecure library func-
tions like gets(), strcpy, strcat(), strncpy(), memccpy() etc. For gets(), strcpy()
and strcat() which don’t validate the length of source strings and blindly copy data into
fixed size buffers, it trace back the source of function arguments and ascertain string lengths
while reviewing code. For strncpy(), it traces back the size argument. If the size argument
is related with user input, this is insecure and a stack buffer overflow may happen. This
work is updated in Dec. 2006. However, there are several limitations on this Gray Box
testing approach. First it targets insecure library function calls only, what if it happens in a
code block that is programmer written? This Grey Box will fail to detect the possible buffer
overflow attacks. Second, it targets stack buffer overflows when the destination buffers are
on stack and have fixed sizes. What if the destination buffer is on heap? Especially what
if the destination buffer size is controllable by user? The Gray Box testing approach can’t
handle those situations. This work still leaves a lot of open problems to the software security
community, even though it is a very good trial to prevent buffer overflow attacks starting
from understanding how a buffer overflow attack can happen.
The big challenges to solve the limitations of this Gray Box testing technique[1] and
target the program on binary code level include but are not limited to the followings:
1.2.1 Handle programmer written data copy procedure.
Most of known buffer overflow happen when the size of the destination buffer is smaller than
the total number of writes through a data copy process.
There are many known buffer overflow vulnerabilities that happen through unsafe usages
of Standard C Library functions e.g. strcpy(). If a buffer overflow vulnerability happens
through unsafe usage of known library functions, we can conclude through function sum-
maries as we know the functionality of those functions in advance. If the data copying process
isn’t accomplished through those known library functions but a programmer implemented
data copy procedure, what should we do? First, how do we locate a programmer written
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data copy procedure? Along a long sequence of codes, how can we know which part of the
code is doing the data coping? Second, after we locate the programmer written data copy
procedure, how can we understand the procedure? Is it similar to strcpy() or is it similar
to strncpy()? What is its exact behavior? This problem is very difficult.
We answer the first question through loop detection. It is based on the observation that
most of known buffer overflow attacks happen in loop context. We studied some standard
library functions that are performing the data coping functionality including strcpy(),
strncpy(), memcpy(), memset() etc. They are all implemented by some loop structures.
The buffer overflow happens when the number of writes after the loop execution exceeds the
destination buffer size limit. We then locate a programmer implemented data copy procedure
through loop detection.
We answer the second question by coming up with a generalized data copy procedure and
perform loop analysis on the generalized data copy procedure. In program modeling com-
munity, the loop behavior is believed to be undetermined. How to understand a programmer
written data copy procedure is believed to be hard. This thesis answers this question by
formulating a general data copy procedure to simplify loop behavior. We perform a series of
analysis to understand it. Please refer to Section 3.3.1 for details.
This thesis work uses a lot of results of the compiler research community which includes
loop detection[66], loop induction variable[66] detection, loop invariant variable[66] detection.
The loop detection and loop induction variable detection are very complicated problems
that have been studied very well by researchers. We studied them in detail and did the
implementation.
Our loop detection can handle both of the reducible CFG (control flow graph) graphs and
the irreducible CFG graphs. The irreducible graph happens in practice. We met irreducible
graphs in our experiences. Black Hat[2] community did loop detection for their approach
requirements. They can only handle reducible CFG graphs[3]. IDAPro’s loop detection
algorithm[4] considers the irreducible CFG graph situation. However it can’t convert the
irreducible CFG to reducible CFG. The behavior of a loop structure in an irreducible CFG
is undetermined. Please refer Section 5.3.1 for details.
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1.2.2 Find vulnerable buffer bound in binary code level.
To understand the BOVC when only the binary program is available is challenging. At a
high level, the binary program itself does not indicate where and how large buffers are within
the program. For example, Figure 3 shows the memory layout for a single function which
has multiple local variables. Although we show the variable information in the diagram, in
binary program itself the entire region would be viewed as a contiguous set of bytes.
The existing research on local variable recovery for binary programs can’t guarantee the
results. The IDAPro disassembler is believed to be the most advanced tool for hostile code
analysis, vulnerability research and software reverse engineering. Its techniques can recover
83% of the local variables and 0% of the fields of heap-allocated objects. The Value-Set
Analysis (VSA)[19] claims that they can correctly identify 88% of the local variables and
89% of the fields of heap-allocated objects. The IDAPro is an industry product and the
VSA[19] is academic work. These two approaches are the best results so far. So, there is no
perfect solution on this problem.
However, in the BOVD problem, we don’t need to recover all of the local variables or
fields of heap-allocated objects. We only want to identify the size of the vulnerable buffer.
We solve this problem by studying runtime traces. This is based on the observation that the
runtime traces contain all of the memory operation history which includes the function call,
function return, memory allocation, memory deallocation, memory access etc. Please refer
to Section 3.3.2 for details.
1.2.3 Extract the relationship of user inputs with buffer overflow factors.
The problem of extracting the relationship of user inputs with the factors that can cause
buffer overflow is equivalent to the path explosion problem in software testing and software
security research. This problem has also been intensively explored by researchers[50, 34, 35,
26, 27, 51, 49]. Among them, the latest results are by Godefroid et al.[50], Brumley et al.[26]
and Bouncer[34].
Brumley et al.[26] propose using weakest precondition to generate vulnerability-based
signatures. In their work, they assume the vulnerability point and the vulnerability condition
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(e.g. the factors that can cause buffer overflow) are given. Their major contribution is on
the path explosion. This work enhances the forward symbolic execution methods[24]. The
forward symbolic execution method does not scale well to large and real programs as the
number of execution paths can be exponential to the number of exploring depth. However,
calculating the weakest precondition is very difficult for programs with loops or recursion
and when the formula generated is very complicated.
Bouncer[34] improves the Vigilante[35]. Vigilante[35] uses the symbolic execution[101, 27]
and path slicing[55] to extract the conditions to reach the vulnerability point on one execution
path. Bouncer[34] contributes on symbolic summaries for common library functions and
generation of alternative exploits guided by symbolic execution for the path explosion.
Godefroid et al.[50] proposes a fuzz testing technique. Compared to the blackbox fuzz
testing approach[41] which applies random mutations to well-formed inputs and test the
program on the resulting values, it performs white-box fuzz testing by applying a new search
algorithm. This new algorithm is designed to partially explore the state space of large
applications;maximize the number of new tests generated from each symbolic execution;apply
heuristics to maximize code coverage; resilient to divergences.
This is an independent research area. We leave this as a future research work to explore
the input analysis in depth. Our current implementation is a simple approach where only
the exploit executed path is examined. Please see Section 8.2 for the discussion of how to
improve the existing approach towards generating zero false negative and zero false positive
signatures.
1.3 APPROACH OVERVIEW.
In this thesis, we provide solutions towards automatic BOVD for commodity software when
source code and debugging information are not available. We combine both of the static
binary program analysis techniques and dynamic taint analysis techniques to achieve this
challenging goal.
Researchers[65, 85, 99, 80] have addressed intensively on finding the BOVP. We use the
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previously proposed dynamic-taint-analysis[72, 76, 39] to do the attack detection. Using the
dynamic taint analysis, a huge class of exploits can be detected for commodity software. We
then search back the collected runtime traces to find out the latest instruction that writes
the security critical data, which is the BOVP.
Based on the observation that buffer overflow attack happens when the size of the des-
tination buffer is smaller than the total number of writes after the data copying process if
the buffer overflow attack happens through a data copy procedure, the BOVC contains the
destination buffer size information, the total number of writes information and how the user
inputs are related with them. The above BOVC results assume the buffer overflow hap-
pens through a data copy procedure. This thesis can also identify the case when the buffer
overflow attack happens through an unchecked array index instead of a data copy procedure.
The BOVC is achieved through three steps analysis. The three steps analysis include
loop analysis, bound analysis and input analysis. The bound analysis answers the size of
the destination buffer information. The loop analysis answers the total number of writes
information of programmer implemented data copy procedure. For buffer overflow attack
happens through standard C library functions (library data copy procedures), we answer the
total number of writes information trough function summaries. The input analysis answers
how the user inputs are related with the size of the destination buffer and the total number
of writes.
Our loop analysis is based on the observation that most of the real world buffer overflow
attacks happen through loop context. We use loop detection to locate a programmer imple-
mented data copy procedure and we propose a generalized data copy procedure and apply
loop analysis on it to answer the total number of writes question.
Given the vulnerable buffer location and the overwritten security critical data (e.g. return
address), we can calculate the coarse-grained bound result of the vulnerable buffer easily.
However, this result can’t protect variables located in between. Using this coarse-grained
bound result, non-control-data attack[29] may happen in the future on the same vulnerability.
Figure 3 compares the difference between coarse-grained bound analysis and fine-grained
bound analysis results.
Our fine-grained bound analysis is achieved through memory traces analysis. This is
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Figure 3: The comparison of coarse-grained and fine-grained bound analysis results.
based on the observation that our runtime traces contain all of the memory update informa-
tion. Because we can overwrite those variables that have not been written, we can guarantee
the fine-grained bound result for the given execution path. Also, because our bound analysis
is independent of the location of the vulnerable buffer, we can handle the buffer overflow
that happens anywhere including stack, heap, Data/BSS.
Our input analysis generates the dynamic slicing of the traces contains the malicious
variable(s) and performs symbolic execution on it to answer how the user inputs are related
with those malicious variable(s).
The direct application of our BOVD results is for the signature generation. We will
use the generated signatures for the real world vulnerable applications to demonstrate the
effectiveness of our approach in Chapter 5. In Chapter 8, we discuss the application of
our BOVD results on automatic patch generation, automatic exploit generation and how to
achieve zero false-positive and zero false-negative signature results by extending this thesis
work.
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1.4 PROBLEM SCOPE
Even though our approach is designed to do BOVD for commodity software when source code
and debugging information are not available, it can be generalized to do the vulnerability
diagnosis for most memory corruption attacks including buffer overflow, format string, inte-
ger overflow that triggers buffer overflow in the working exploit and double free. This thesis
work targeted on binary programs, while it can also be implemented at source code level
to do the software verification during the software testing stage. It would be an enhanced
version of the Grey Box Testing tool[1].
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS
In summary, this thesis makes the following contributions:
• It combines both of the static binary program analysis techniques and dynamic taint
analysis techniques to achieve the BOVD. It extends the existing dynamic-taint-analysis
attack detection tool to do the BOVP detection and performs three steps analysis towards
understanding BOVC. The three steps analysis are loop analysis, bound analysis and
input analysis.
• It uses loop analysis to understand programmer written data copy procedures under
reasonable loop heuristic assumptions. This is based on the observation of all known
buffer overflow attacks that most of them take place in loop context.
• It achieves fine-grained bound analysis result of the vulnerable buffer using novel memory
trace analysis approach. This can be achieved based on the fact that the runtime traces
contain all of the memory operation history. This memory operation includes function
call, function return, variable push and pop, variable load and store, malloc, free etc.
• It performs buffer overflow vulnerability case study which may have independent inter-
ests to security engineers. There are six basic buffer overflow vulnerability cases that
are based on several assumptions. The six basic cases can cover all of the real world
vulnerable applications that this thesis work studied. Other cases by removing each of
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the assumptions are also discussed. This result can help other researchers to design more
effective buffer overflow response and debugging systems.
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, the existing attempts on
vulnerability diagnosis and the limitations of each approach are given. As the direct applica-
tion of BOVD is for vulnerability-based signature generation, the research work on signature
generation is also summarized. I also summarized the buffer overflow defense systems that
researchers have developed, none of which can defend against the buffer overflow attacks
completely. In Chapter 3, it describes the proposed BOVD solution of this thesis work
which includes the dynamic analysis engine, the static analysis engine and the diagnosis en-
gine. Among them, the diagnosis engine is the major contribution of this thesis work. After
that, we discuss how the proposed BOVD approach can handle the vulnerability diagnosis
for format string vulnerability and double free vulnerability. In Chapter 4, we perform the
buffer overflow vulnerability case study. This result can help other researchers to design
more effective buffer overflow attack response systems and debugging tools. The implemen-
tation detail and experiments are displayed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. In Chapter 6,
we evaluate the proposed BOVD approach and test the buffer overflow vulnerability case
study results. We also perform intensive loop studies of WCET benchmark and some real
world applications to evaluate how our loop analysis can handle different loop structures.
The Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 are for the discussion and application of the proposed BOVD
approach. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis work.
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2.0 RELATED WORK
No previous work has addressed the vulnerability diagnosis problem thoroughly. All of the
existing attempts[65, 85, 99, 69, 72, 80, 95] can find the vulnerability point using different
approaches but none can figure out the vulnerability conditions. Bouncer[34] can only un-
derstand vulnerability conditions when the vulnerability happens through unsafe usages of
library functions. Each approach and its limitations will be discussed briefly in Section 2.1.
Signature generation is one of the traditional defense schemes for Internet security at-
tacks. The direct application of the BOVD is for automatic vulnerability-based signature
generation[24, 26] for buffer overflow attacks. In section 2.2, I will review the related work
on this research field.
Even though this thesis work is the first to investigate the vulnerability diagnosis problem,
researchers have invented various mitigation techniques to defend against intrusion attacks
on buffer overflow vulnerabilities. In Section 2.3, I summarize this research topic briefly
which has been very active during the last few decades.
2.1 EXISTING ATTEMPTS
The existing attempts[72, 65, 85, 99, 95, 80] on vulnerability diagnosis all do attack detection
using different methods, more or less vulnerability analysis. Among them, [72, 65, 85, 99, 95]
apply their attack detection and vulnerability analysis results for signature generation. They
all can find the vulnerability point (some can only handle special cases), but none can provide
any semantic information of the vulnerable program. COVERS[65], DIRA[85] and Packet
Vaccine[95] use input fields’ lengths in their signature results. MemSherlock[80] considers the
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destination buffer size variable as another factor that can cause buffer overflow vulnerability.
However, they all can’t handle any other buffer overflow vulnerability cases.
COVERS[65] assumes that some part of the exploit will overflow some pointer values.
They then do the forensic analysis of the victim memory region surrounding the corrupted
pointer value by string matching it with the exploit. They do further context identification to
figure out which fields of the input triggered the attack. They obtain the length constraints
by analyzing all of the existing benign inputs and using the longest length value as the length
constraints of that field. Their results can introduce false positives and they can’t handle
other buffer overflow cases. Another limitation of this approach is that it can’t handle any
encoding/decoding of the exploit during the program execution.
Xu et al. apply both static program analysis and hardware watch point to find out the
corrupting instruction[99]. After that, they do the value propagation to find the propagation
history of the corrupted data. Unfortunately, they don’t use this information as a diagnosis
result to do the signature generation. Their diagnostic result is the instruction that corrupts
the sensitive data and the stack trace when memory corrupts. They generate the signature
also by simply using the value that overwrites the sensitive data.
DIRA[85] proposes to extend the GCC compiler to instrument the source code. It checks
every control-sensitive data. The resulting programs can detect the buffer overflow attacks.
After the detection of the attack, it will trace back the memory logging data to the input to
identify which packets are responsible for the attack. The signature is simply the malicious
packets information including the regular expression of the packets and the length constraints
which can protect the attack using the same exploit. It is also limited by requiring source
code, modifying GCC compiler, protecting control-sensitive data only.
Newsome et al.[72] proposes using the dynamic taint analysis to do the attack detection.
They can find the vulnerability point easily by comparing with other approaches as they
collect all of the runtime traces. They generate the signature using the input value that is
used to overwrite the security critical data which is far from satisfaction. This thesis work
is an extension of their work.
Packet Vaccine[95] randomizes address-like strings in packet to do the attack detection.
For buffer overflow exploits, they generate alternative inputs by changing the size of the
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anomalously long fields. So, they consider the length of the input fields as the only factor
that can cause a buffer overflow. Also, the generated bound result is coarse-grained bound
result.
MemSherlock[80] requires source code and debugging information which may not be
available for commodity software. It does the taint analysis for the copied value and the
malloc size parameter, so there are buffer overflow cases as discussed in Chapter 4 that they
can’t handle.
The running example demonstrated in Figure 23 shows how the existing attempts will
fail to diagnose it correctly. It has a programmer implemented data copy procedure that
has an integer field controls the total number of writes instead of the source buffer size.
The destination buffer is on heap, however, it is an array element of a struct. Its size
isn’t determined by a malloc size variable. None of the above approaches can diagnose this
example correctly.
VSEF[69] performs diagnosis at execution level. It can successfully generate the vulner-
ability point but it can’t provide any semantic information for the vulnerable program.
Larochelle’s static analysis of source code to detect likely buffer overflow vulnerabilities[63]
relies on source code and the semantic annotations.
2.2 SIGNATURE GENERATION
There are two classes of signatures, content-based or exploit-based signatures[60, 70, 40, 84,
61] and vulnerability-based signatures[24, 26, 94]. Autograph[60], EarlyBird[84], Honeycomb[61]
and Polygraphs[70] search for invariants from the exploit traffic which are defined as exploit-
based signatures[26]. Since they are based on specific exploit instances either by pattern
matching or exploit syntax/semantics analysis. They may have both high false-positive
rates and high false-negative rates[71, 74].
Brumley et al. are the first to propose generating signatures based on the semantic
information of the vulnerable program using forward symbolic execution[24] and backward
weakest precondition[26]. However, they assume the vulnerability point and the vulnerability
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condition are given in both approaches. Their contributions are more on the program path
exploration (or the input analysis step in this thesis work). This thesis work concentrates
on how to find the vulnerability point and vulnerability condition. This thesis’s solution
can bridge the gap of Brumley’s work by providing the vulnerability point and vulnerability
condition for buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
Shield[94] is an attack defense system by content-based filtering. The signature for the
filtering is vulnerability-based signatures that are generated manually. This thesis’s results
can highly benefit the security engineers to find the vulnerability point and to understand
the vulnerability condition to generate the patches and signatures accurately and efficiently.
ShieldGen[41] is a black-box approach for generating signatures for unknown vulnerabil-
ities. Their coarse-grained bound results for their buffer overflow vulnerabilities may cause
future non-control data attacks[29] by overwriting a local variable. They also can’t handle
the case when multiple input fields are involved in the BOVC.
Bouncer[34] applies function summary and path slicing to understand the vulnerability
conditions when the vulnerability happens through unsafe usage of library functions. How-
ever, it can’t handle when the vulnerability happens through some programmer implemented
code blocks. Also, the bound result is obtained through static analysis of binary programs.
The static analysis can’t guarantee the local variable recovery.
2.3 BUFFER OVERFLOW DEFENSE SYSTEMS
Various mitigation techniques have been proposed to defend against the buffer overflow
attacks. In this subsection, I summarize them briefly. They are grouped by their implemen-
tation approaches.
Compiler Patches or Extensions: Cowan et al. proposed StackGuard[37] and PointGuard[36]
by inserting terminator or random canaries to protect the return address and function point-
ers, etc. Similar to StackGuard and PointGuard but using a more secure protection system,
StackShield[91] enhances the GCC compiler to protect overwriting of the return address
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and function pointers. ProPolice[47] is a more sophisticated GCC compiler extension for
protecting applications from stack-smashing attacks. It reorders the local variables that
the char buffers always are allocated at the bottom so they can’t overflow any other local
variables. It also protects the stack frame in a similar way to StackGuard. Return Ad-
dress Defender[31], RAD, also a GCC patch, protects return address by storing a copy of
the return address and compare the return address with the stored one each time when it
returns. StackGhost[48] provides similar approaches to both of the RAD and StackGuard to
protect the return address. A cryptographic method of the return address is also proposed
in StackGhost.
In order to protect stack smashing, researchers proposed to have non-executable stack[42].
But there are many workarounds of this solution. For example, buffer overflows on the
heap/BSS/Data targeting the function pointers or longjmp buffers are not protected.
Boundary check may be the only solution that can prevent buffer overflow attacks com-
pletely. Jones and Kelly is the first to propose the GCC compiler patch[58] for bound
checking at run-time. CRED[78] is then proposed to enhance the approach. Unfortunately,
it suffers from the performance loss. Also the approaches in this category requires the access
of source code and they can’t be used to help the existing legacy systems.
Linking Stage: One possible source of buffer overflow comes from some of the standard
string copy C libraries, like strcpy(), sprintf(), memset() etc., which don’t do the bound
checking. Libsafe[20] is proposed to patch the standard C libraries to do boundary check.
Since then, Libverify[21] and Libsafeplus[18] are proposed to enhance Libsafe by providing
return address verification etc. However, their bound checking only address the standard C
libraries, they will fail to protect the program if the programmer implements the memory
handling on his own.
Source Code Level: D. Wagner et al. proposed several methods of static analysis of
source code to detect buffer overflow vulnerabilities[93, 92]. They proposed doing integer
range analysis[93]. They also proposed modeling the program’s correct execution behavior
through source code analysis and use this model to do the run-time execution monitoring[92].
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CodeSonar[11], a commercial tool that does source-code level analysis that identifies com-
plex bugs at compile time. CCured[67, 68] and Cyclone[56] change the C program syntax
to enhance type and bounds checking. However, these approaches won’t be able to help for
legacy systems of commercial software when the source code isn’t available.
In summary, each of the above approaches has its own strengths and also has its own
limitations. None of them can defend against buffer overflows completely. Due to the
dichotomy between arrays and pointers, complete array bound checking is impossible in C.
For example, some compilers can provide the array indexing protection like in buffer[i],
but fail the protection for buffer + i.
Most of the above approaches are analyzed and studied in the comparison studies[97, 83].
These two comparison study are published in 2003. Since then, researchers have explored
other methods to defend against buffer overflow attacks including the following Program
Randomization, Program Integrity Analysis and Dynamic Taint Analysis.
Program Randomization: Some researchers also proposed to randomize some parts of
the operating system, e.g. the location of the stack, the location of the heap, the instruction
set etc., to make the attack more difficult[22, 30, 59, 81, 86, 62, 23]. However, they still can’t
defend the attack completely.
Program Integrity Approaches: In 2006, Castro et al. proposed to achieve secure
software system through enforcing Data-flow Integrity[28]. They do the static data depen-
dency analysis and instrument the program at runtime to check the data-flow integrity. The
same idea was presented by Zhou et al. in MICRO-37 2004 using hardware support[102].
Abadi et al. proposed to enforcing Control-flow Integrity[15] to defend against software
attacks. This work checks the validation of the control target at run-time. The valid desti-
nation targets of each control are determined by the Control Flow Graph (CFG) generated
through static analysis.
In 2008, Akritidis et al. proposed preventing memory error exploits by enforcing write
integrity[17]. They use points-to analysis at compile time to compute the set of objects that
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can be written by each instruction in the program.
Dynamic Taint Analysis: Dynamic taint analysis technique emerges to computer
security community in around 2004 to detect overwritten-based attacks. Using the dynamic
taint analysis[72, 76, 39, 88, 90], a huge class of exploits can be detected for commodity
software where source code and the patched libraries aren’t available.
Crandall et al. proposed Minos[39], a micro-architecture implementation of Dynamic
Taint Analysis. Suh et al. proposed similar Dynamic Information Flow Tracking [88] using
hardware support (each register has an one-bit tag). In the same year, RIFLE[90], another
hardware support computer architecture is proposed by Vachharajani et al. from Prince-
ton to enforce information-flow security. Concurrently and independently, Newsome et.al.
worked on the software implementation of this dynamic taint analysis in binary level[72].
Newsome’s work[72] achieved dynamic taint analysis that doesn’t need any hardware or OS
modifications. In 2006, Qin et al. improved the binary level software approach by using a
more efficient dynamic binary translator and by applying three optimization techniques[76].
Xu et al. also implemented fine-grained taint analysis in source code level[100].
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3.0 THIS THESIS APPROACH
In this section, we will discuss about this thesis’ approach towards automatic and accurate
buffer overflow vulnerability diagnosis in detail.
Figure 4: The System Architecture
The high level architecture is demonstrated in Figure 4. It consists of three major com-
ponents: the dynamic analysis engine, the static analysis engine and the diagnosis engine.
The dynamic analysis engine obtains the runtime information about the vulnerable program
by executing the vulnerable program on the given exploit. We refer to this runtime infor-
mation as dynamic model. The static analysis engine extracts the static information from
the vulnerable binary program. The static analysis results are referred to as static model.
The diagnosis engine correlates the dynamic model and the static model to infer the BOVP
and BOVC. The diagnosis engine is the major contribution of this thesis work. Figure 5
illustrates the inner structure of the diagnosis engine which will be discussed in detail in
Section 3.3.
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Figure 5: The Inner Structure of Diagnosis Engine
3.1 DYNAMIC ANALYSIS ENGINE
The dynamic analysis engine generates a dynamic model describing how the vulnerable
program processes an exploit. At a higher level, the dynamic model consists of a trace of
CPU and memory state updates as the vulnerable program executes on the exploit.
More specifically, the dynamic analysis engine runs the vulnerable program in an em-
ulated environment that is capable of dynamic taint analysis. When sending the exploit
input to the program, the dynamic analysis engine marks the input as tainted, and tracks
the tainted data propagation in the program. It starts to record the dynamic model starting
from when the exploit is initially read in. For each user-space instruction executed from the
process of that program, the dynamic analysis engine records the current program counter,
the current instruction, the values of its operands, the taint status of the operands, current
ESP value etc. It keeps recording until the tainted exploit input is misused, such as when it is
loaded into CPU’s instruction pointer register. Similarly, if the exploit is to attack a kernel
vulnerability, the dynamic analysis engine records the dynamic states for the instructions in
the kernel space.
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3.2 STATIC ANALYSIS ENGINE
The static analysis engine creates a static model from the vulnerable program (including any
libraries it is linked against). Unlike the dynamic analysis model, the static model contains
the information about the whole program, not just the execution path traversed and states
touched during the dynamic analysis process. Thus, the static model can provide information
that is unavailable in the dynamic model.
To construct a static model, the static analysis engine parses and disassembles the pro-
gram binary. The static analysis engine raises the binary program to intermediate repre-
sentation (IR) program and does preprocessing of the IR program. Specifically, it does the
constant propagation, deadcode elimination, static single assignment (SSA) generation. The
static analysis engine also generates the control flow graph (CFG) of the IR program that is
raised from the program binary.
3.3 DIAGNOSIS ENGINE
Figure 5 illustrates the inner structure of the diagnosis engine. It includes the BOVP detec-
tion and the BOVC analysis. The BOVC analysis is achieved through loop analysis, bound
analysis and input analysis. The loop analysis is skipped if the data copy procedure is known
standard C library functions or system functions.
Given the dynamic model, the BOVP is achieved by searching back the taint trace to
find out the latest instruction that overwrites the security critical data, which is the BOVP.
Please refer to Section 7.6 for how we handle the malicious array index cases when the BOVP
doesn’t belong to any data copy procedure.
In the remaining of this section, we will concentrate on the discussion of how we combine
the dynamic model, the static model, and the BOVP information to understand the BOVC.
Specifically, we will discuss about the three steps analysis: the loop analysis, the bound
analysis and the input analysis.
22
3.3.1 Loop Analysis
For buffer overflow vulnerabilities that happen through unsafe usage of standard C library
functions, we obtain the total number of writes information through function summary.
We apply loop analysis to understand programmer implemented data copy procedure. Our
loop analysis step is based on the observation of all known buffer overflow attacks that
most of them take place in loop context. We apply loop detection to locate a programmer
implemented data copy procedure. We come up with a generalized data copy procedure
and apply loop analysis to infer the total number of writes of executing this programmer
implemented data copy procedure. In my previous work[44], the loop structure also helps
on the switch design to enable predictive multiplexed switching in multiprocessor networks.
iv1 = iv1init;
iv2 = iv2init;
while (iv1 < Loop_Bound){
writeAddress = startAddress + startOffset + iv2;
[writeAddress] = {some value};
iv2 += iv2upate;
iv1 += iv1upate;
}
Figure 6: A Data Copy Procedure
Figure 6 demonstrates the pseudo-code for generalized data copy procedure. The iv1
and iv2 are loop induction variables (iv)[66] that are updated by regular patterns during
each loop iteration. A buffer overflow occurs when the destination buffer is written beyond
its bound.
In this data copy procedure, the number of loop iterations is defined in Equation 3.1 and
the number of writes in each loop iteration to the destination buffer is iv2update. So the total
number of writes after the loop execution will be as in Equation 3.2. If the Equation 3.3
can be guaranteed, we can say this data copy procedure is safe. Otherwise, this data copy
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is vulnerable. In this example, if the user can control any variable in Equation 3.3, a buffer
overflow attack may occur.
numIteration =
Loop Bound− iv1init
iv1update
(3.1)
totalNumWrites = iv2update × numIteration (3.2)
sizeof(destination) > startOffset+ iv2init + totalNumWrites (3.3)
We assume the loop body won’t change the Loop Bound value to make the above equa-
tions accurate. The same loop heuristic is also applied in Larochelle’s work[63]. We also
apply some other loop heuristics. Here, we list all of the loop heuristics we use:
• The loop body won’t update the Loop Bound value. This loop heuristic is necessary and
sufficient to make Equation 3.1, Equation 3.2 and Equation 3.3 accurate.
• If the loop exit condition is source[j] == c, we infer the Loop Bound is the string
length of the source buffer until the first encounter if c, we use strlen(source|c) to
represent this. Specifically, if c equals 0, we infer the Loop Bound is the source buffer
size, strlen(source).
• We assume the attacker may only control the Loop Bound and the vulnerable buffer size
variable to trigger the buffer overflow attack to simplify the problem. Even though if the
attacker can control any variable in Equation 3.3, a buffer overflow attack may occur.
The above loop heuristics work very well in practice. We make the third loop heuristic to
simplify our prototype implementation. In Section 4.2, we generate other buffer overflow
cases by removing this assumption.
After this step analysis, we can figure out the vulnerable buffer and the total number
of writes of the data copy procedure in symbolic forms. For known Standard C Library
functions and known system calls that do the data copy, we can obtain the number of writes
and the vulnerable buffer information directly through function summary as we know the
definitions of those functions in advance. This loop analysis helps us to analyze the data
copy procedures implemented by programmers.
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We first do the loop detection to find the loop that contains the BOVP. We then do
the loop induction variable (iv) detection. Especially we want to find the ivi that is used
to control the loop iterations and the ivw that composes write index. We also do the loop
variant variable detection which may be composed of a loop invariant variable[66] and an
iv variable. The vulnerable buffer writes are indexed by those variables. We then study the
loop exit condition to infer Loop Bound information. If the loop exit condition source[i]
== 0, we infer the Loop Bound is the source buffer size. If the loop exit condition is i <
a, we know the Loop Bound is the integer a. For loop exit condition is source[i] == 0,
we further look for the ivi that composes the read index to calculate the number of loop
iterations. The memory write instruction that is indexed through some loop variant variables
may indicate the vulnerable buffer.
Multiple Loop Exit Conditions. For the loop constructs that have multiple loop
exit conditions, we have multiple Loop Bounds. We use logical or to represent them. For
example, if we have loop exit conditions source[j] == 0 and i < a, the Loop Bound is a
|| sizeof(source). We then look for the iv1 that updates i and the iv2 that composes the
read index j. The estimated number of loop iterations is min(a−iv1init
iv1update
, sizeof(source)
iv2update
).
Some critical instruction address information are transferred to the bound analysis step.
Those instructions include the conditional jump instruction (loop exit condition), memory
write instructions and memory read instructions.
Please refer to Section 7.1 for how we handle other complicated loop situations.
3.3.2 Bound Analysis
In this step, we want to answer the sizeof(dest) information in Equation 3.3. To be more
specific, we want to find the location and size of the vulnerable buffer. The vulnerable buffer
size can be a fixed number, e.g. the vulnerable buffer is on stack, Data/BSS, or an array
member of a struct. It can also be a variable, e.g. the malloc size.
Our novel fine-grained bound analysis step is achieved by analyzing the memory traces.
Our dynamic model contains the runtime traces. Our runtime traces record the current
program counter, the current instruction, the values of its operands, the taint status of the
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Figure 7: Our bound analysis approach: memory traces analysis
operands, the current ESP value, the function information of the instruction. The ESP is
the stack pointer. They include all of the memory access and memory update information.
The Figure 7 demonstrates our bound analysis approach. We use a bit vector to represent
the memory space. We use one bit to represent one DWORD (4 bytes) in the real memory
space. In practice, this works pretty well.
At higher level, we want to use the bit vector states to represent the memory states. Once
we have memory states update, we update the bit vector states. We mark the bit to 1 when
the corresponding memory region stores data e.g. return address, old EBP , metadata, local
variable access etc. The EBP is the base pointer. We reset the bit to 0 when corresponding
memory is cleaned, e.g. function return, free function call etc. Specifically, our static
model can provide the memory operation functions information. Those memory operation
functions include malloc, calloc and free. With this information, we can identify the
memory operation function call in the runtime traces.
Each instruction contains the current ESP value. By parsing our traces for the first
round, we can estimate the stack range using the ESP values, the heap bound using the
malloc returns. Given the results after first round scan, we can distinguish a memory access
on stack, heap or Data/BSS. During the second round scan, we will update the bit vector to
represent the memory state updates. Specifically, we compare the ESP value of the current
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instruction with the previous instruction. If the ESP value is increased, it can be a POP
instruction or a function return. We reset the bits corresponding to the memory regions
between the two ESPs to 0. Otherwise, if the ESP is increased or isn’t changed, we mark the
bits corresponding to the memory accesses of that instruction to 1. The call instruction is
handled separately because the ESP value is increased but there is no memory access of the
call instruction.
We also handle the memory operation functions at the same time. Given the memory
operation functions information from the static model, we can distinguish the function calls
of malloc, calloc and free in our runtime traces. When we meet the malloc function call,
we mark the bits for the metadata location to 1. Those metadata address information are
also in our runtime traces. The calloc function is handled differently, because besides the
metadata, the data region are also accessed in the runtime traces. We reset the data region
specifically after the calloc return. We maintain a memory allocation history to record
malloc and calloc function calls. Each record contains the instruction address that makes
the function call, the size parameter information, metadata addresses information. When
we meet a free function call, the function parameter has the value of the starting address
of the memory region to free. We then search the memory allocation history for the latest
record that matches the free function call to determine the memory region for bit vector
resetting. We also maintain a memory deallocation history that contains each free function
call information. This can be used to diagnose the double free vulnerability.
With the above implementation, we still can’t handle when the vulnerable buffer had
been already written by another data copy procedure before the data copying process that
causes the buffer overflow attack. We meet this situation in real world application, atphttpd,
during our experimental study. To handle this case, we also maintain an instruction-id array
to help marking the bound of a memory object instead of each bit. If a write instruction is
not within a data copy procedure, we simply use the instruction address as the instruction
id. If a write instruction is within a library function, we use that library function’s name
concatenated with the call address as the instruction id. This is used to distinguish the
different calls of the same library function. If a write instruction is within a programmer
implemented data copy procedure, we use the function name concatenated with the loop id
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as the instruction id. This is used to diagnose the data copy implemented through sequential
loops. When we reset the the bit vector, we will also reset the instruction id array. When we
mark the bit vector, we will compare the current instruction id with the instruction id for
the previous bit first. If they have the same id, we will update the instruction-id array only
and we ignore the bit vector updates. The continuous memory region that is updated by
instructions with the same instruction-id are inferred as data array. The continuous memory
region that is updated by instructions with the same same function name concatenated with
different loop-id are inferred as data array.
We can now infer the bound information using our bit vector which marks the bound of
memory objects. Once we reach the first memory write instruction of the vulnerable data
copy procedure (this information is given from the loop analysis), we first check the location
of the vulnerable buffer. If it is on stack or Data/BSS, we simply search the next 1 on the
bit vector. The vulnerable buffer size is 4×searchSteps. If it is on heap, we first do the
same search for next 1 on the bit vector. We then compare the size results with the malloc
size parameter value (this can be obtained from the memory allocation history). If they
are equal, then the malloc size parameter determines the vulnerable buffer size. In this
case, we check the taint information of the malloc size variable. Otherwise, the vulnerable
buffer is an array member of a struct or object, we will return a fix number in this case.
For example, in Figure 7, the vulnerable buffer is on stack and the size of the vulnerable
buffer is 4× 5 = 20 bytes. In our running example in Figure 23, the vulnerable buffer is on
heap but the vulnerable buffer size is not determined by the malloc size parameter, but a
fixed number 36. The variable access sequence matters in this approach. However, we can
overwrite those variables that haven’t been written.
In bound analysis step, we also check the taint information for Loop Bound. This
Loop Bound is the corresponding function parameter if the data copy procedure is some
standard C library function. If the BOVP belongs to a programmer written data copy pro-
cedure, the Loop Bound information (instruction address) is passed from the loop analysis
step. We also check the taint information of the malloc size parameter if the vulnerable
buffer size is determined by that variable.
28
3.3.3 Input Analysis
Once we obtain the taint information of the vulnerable buffer size variable (if applicable)
and the Loop Bound, we calculate the dynamic slicing of the runtime traces that contain the
tainted variables and perform forward symbolic execution along the trace to figure out how
the user inputs are related with them. For example, if the vulnerable buffer size is determined
by a malloc size parameter and that variable is tainted, we will obtain the slicing contains
that variable. We then run symbolic execution to see how the input is related with it. If
Loop Bound is the source buffer size and the source buffer is tainted, we obtain the slicing
that contains the source buffer. We perform symbolic execution to see how the input is
related with the source buffer variable, or how the source buffer is constructed.
Only one execution path is examined in the above input analysis. It can’t generate the
condition to guarantee the program execution reach the vulnerability point. The signature
generated using the above approach will introduce low false negatives and low false positives.
The low false negatives can happen when a new exploit explores a new execution path and
how the inputs are related with the vulnerability condition is different on that path. The
low false positives happen when changing other input fields makes the vulnerability point
unreachable.
We can also return the static slicing of the program that contains those malicious variables
to help security engineers to do precise signature generation. This can greatly reduce the
workload for security engineers.
As discussed in Section 1.2, the input analysis is an independent research field. This thesis
only addresses this problem simply. This isn’t a major contribution of this thesis work. In
Section 8.2, we will discuss about how to enhance this thesis work towards generating zero
false-positive and zero false-negative signatures for buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
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3.4 HANDLING OTHER MEMORY CORRUPTION ATTACKS
3.4.1 Format String Vulnerability.
All of the format string vulnerabilities occur in Standard C printf family functions. Once
we figure out that the BOVP belongs to one of those functions, we check the taint status
of the format string. If the format string is tainted, this program is vulnerable for format
string vulnerability. If we can determine the number of args in the vararg, we can restrict
the number of directives appear in the format string. If the format string is not tainted, we
continue our normal BOVD process.
3.4.2 Double Free.
Double free vulnerability occurs by calling free function twice on the same memory address
without allocating the same memory region between the two free function calls. The bound
analysis step of our diagnosis engine maintains a memory allocation history and a memory
deallocation history. We diagnose the double free vulnerability by extending the current
BOVD implementation. When we meet a free function call, we check the current memory
deallocation history. If there is a record that frees the same memory region and we can’t find
a record on the memory allocation history that allocate this memory region between this
two free function calls, we can diagnose that there is a double free vulnerability. We return
the two free records as the diagnosis results. This result is much better than the current
systems which can only indicate which memory address has double free. Our double free
diagnosis results can return which two free function calls can cause double free.
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4.0 BUFFER OVERFLOW CASE STUDY
From Chapter 2, we can see the existing diagnosis attempts and vulnerability-based signature
generation approaches are far from satisfaction. Researchers use their own heuristics on how
a buffer overflow attack can happen when they design their defense and debugging systems.
There is no previous research on studying the reasons that can cause a buffer overflow or
the buffer overflow case study.
In this Chapter, we do buffer overflow vulnerability case study. We only consider the
buffer overflow vulnerabilities that can be controllable by the user inputs. Because only in
those cases, the attacker can attack the buffer overflow vulnerability by generating zero-day
buffer overflow attacks through Internet. We don’t consider those buffer overflow vulnerabil-
ities that are built-in the programs. For example, both of the sizeof(dest) and total number
of writes are fixed and the sizeof(dest) is less than the total number of writes. There are
six basic basic cases that are built on serials assumptions. We provide the diagnosis results,
signature suggestions and patch suggestions for each basic case. By removing each assump-
tion of the basic cases, we come up with the other buffer overflow vulnerability cases. We
prove that the case study results (basic cases and other cases) are complete. By the end of
this Chapter, we study some sample Standard C Library and System functions that have
caused buffer overflow vulnerabilities in real world applications. We will state under what
conditions those functions may cause buffer overflows.
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4.1 SIX BASIC CASES
The six basic cases cover all of the real world buffer overflow vulnerabilities we have studied.
The basic bases are based on the following assumptions:
• Assume the buffer overflow attack happens through a data copy procedure. This data
copy procedure is a code block that writes contents to a data array. It can be in any
format including the generalized data copy procedure (one or more loop exits), data copy
procedure implemented through nested loops, or sequential write statements.
• Assume the attacker can only control the sizeof(dest) or/and Loop Bound.
• Assume the Loop Bound includes the two major loop exit condition cases for a data
copy procedure. One is source[i] == c and the other is j < a. The Loop Bound is
strlen(source|c) and a respectively.
• Assume there is one Loop Bound or one loop exit condition of the data copy procedure.
So the generalized data copy procedure with multiple loop exits or data copy procedure
implemented through nested loops are excluded.
To simplify the analysis results, we assume the iv composes the read index is i = i+ 1,
the iv for loop iteration variable is j = j + 1 and the write index contains an iv that has
form k = k + 1, to simplify the analysis results.
We use s to represent a fixed value for size, a to represent a fixed value for an integer,
us to represent a user controllable value for array size, ua to represent a user controllable
value for an integer. We use U(us) and U(ua) to represent how the user inputs are related
with the us and ua.
Loop Exit Condition is source[i] == c. Using one of our loop heuristics, the
Loop Bound is the string length of the source buffer until the first encounter of c when the
loop exit condition is source[i]== c. We use strlen(source|c) to represent this. There
are three buffer overflow vulnerability cases based on what values the user input can control:
the strlen(source|c), the vulnerable buffer size, or both.
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• Case I: The strlen(source|c) is related with user input. Source buffer is from user
input and the vulnerable buffer has a fixed value size. We found several real world buffer
overflow vulnerable applications belonging to this case, e.g. CSRSS(MS06-040). The
diagnosis results: vulnerable buffer location, vulnerable buffer size (s), the total number
of writes is strlen(source|c) (us) and how it is related with the user inputs (U(us)).
The signature suggestion: s > U(us). The patch suggestion: add s > us condition check
before the data copy procedure. The example vulnerable program is demonstrated in
Figure 24.
• Case II: Vulnerable buffer size is related with user input. In this case, the source
buffer is fixed. The vulnerable buffer is on heap and the vulnerable buffer size is de-
termined by the malloc size parameter. This variable is directly from user input or
related with user input (e.g. integer overflow happens from the input value to the mal-
loc size). The diagnosis results: heap buffer overflow, malloc size parameter (ua), the
strlen(source|c) (s), how the malloc size variable is related with the user inputs
(U(ua)). The signature suggestion: U(ua) > s. The patch suggestion: add ua > s
condition check before the data copy procedure. The example vulnerable program is
demonstrated in Figure 25.
• Case III: Both of the strlen(source|c) and vulnerable buffer size are related
with user inputs. The diagnosis results: heap buffer overflow, malloc size parameter
(ua), the strlen(source|c) (us), how the malloc size parameter and source buffer
are related with the user inputs (U(ua) and U(us)). The signature suggestion: U(ua)
> U(us). The patch suggestion: add ua > us condition check before the data copy
procedure. The example vulnerable program is demonstrated in Figure 26.
Loop Exit Condition is j < a. The Loop Bound is a when the loop exit condition
is j < a. There are three buffer overflow vulnerability cases based on what values the user
inputs can control, the Loop Bound a, the vulnerable buffer size, or both.
• Case IV: Integer bound a is related with user input. The vulnerable buffer has
a fixed size value. We find real world vulnerable program, MS07-017, belongs to this
case. The diagnosis results: vulnerable buffer location, vulnerable buffer size (a), integer
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bound (ua), how the integer bound ua is related with the user inputs (U(ua)). The
signature suggestion: a > U(ua). The patch suggestion: add a > ua condition check
before the data copy procedure. The example vulnerable program is demonstrated in
Figure 27 which is motivated by real world vulnerable application, ANI(MS07017).
• Case V: Vulnerable buffer size is related with user input. The vulnerable buffer
is on heap and its size is determined by a variable. The integer bound a is a constant.
We find real world vulnerable program, nullhttpd, belongs to this case. The diagnosis
results: heap buffer overflow, malloc size parameter (ua), integer bound (a), how the
malloc size variable is related with the user input (U(ua)). The signature suggestion:
U(ua) > a. The patch suggestion: add ua > a condition check before the data copy
procedure. The example vulnerable program is demonstrated in Figure 28 which is
motivated by real world vulnerable application, nullhttpd.
• Case VI: Both of the vulnerable buffer size variable and the integer bound
variable are related to the user inputs. We find real world vulnerable program,
PNG(MS05-025), belongs to this case. The diagnosis results: heap buffer overflow, malloc
size parameter (ua1), integer bound (ua2), how the malloc size parameter and integer
bound variable are related with the user inputs (U(ua1) and U(ua2)). The signature
suggestion: U(ua1) > U(ua2). The patch suggestion: add ua1 > ua2 condition check
before the data copy procedure. The example vulnerable program is demonstrated in
Figure 28 which is motivated by real world vulnerable application, PNG(MS05025).
4.2 OTHER CASES
There are many other buffer overflow vulnerability cases beyond the above six basic cases.
The following four categories of other cases are generated by removing each of the above
assumptions.
Multiple loop exit conditions. There are two situations when we have multiple loop
exits. One is when there are multiple loop exits on the generalized data copy procedure.
The other is when the data copy procedure is implemented through nested loops. Figure 8
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and Figure 9 illustrate these two situations.
iv1 = iv1init;
iv2 = iv2init;
iv3 = iv3init;
while(iv1 < Loop_Bound1 || iv3 < Loop_Bound2){
writeAddress = startAddress + startOffset + iv2;
[writeAddress] = {some value};
iv2 += iv2upate;
iv1 += iv1upate;
iv3 += iv3update;
}
Figure 8: A Data Copy Procedure with Multiple Loop Bounds (I)
For the generalized data copy procedure that have multiple loop exit conditions, we have
multiple Loop Bounds as illustrated in Figure 8. We use logical or to represent them. For
example, if we have loop exit conditions source[i] == 0 and j < a, the Loop Bound is a
|| sizeof(source). We then look for the iv1 that updates the read index i for source and
the iv3 that updates j. The estimated number of loop iterations ismin(
sizeof(source)
iv1update
, a−iv3init
iv3update
).
Besides the two Loop Bound variables, the vulnerable buffer size is the third variable that is
controllable by user inputs. Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.2 show how to calculate the total
number of loop iterations and the total number of writes generally.
numIteration = min(
Loop Bound1 − iv1init
iv1update
,
Loop Bound2 − iv3init
iv3update
) (4.1)
totalNumWrites = iv2update × numIteration (4.2)
For example, the vulnerable buffer is on stack with fixed size (s), the integer bound (ua)
and the source buffer size (us) are related with user inputs. The diagnosis results: vulnerable
buffer location, vulnerable buffer size (s), integer bound variable (ua), source buffer size (us),
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iv1 = iv1init;
iv2 = iv2init;
iv3 = iv3init;
while(iv1 < Loop_Bound1) {
while(iv3 < Loop_Bound2) {
writeAddress = startAddress + startOffset + iv2;
[writeAddress] = {some value};
iv2 += iv2upate;
iv3 += iv3update;
}
iv1 += iv1upate;
}
Figure 9: A Data Copy Procedure implemented through Nested loops
how integer bound (ua) and source buffer (us) are related with the user inputs (U(ua) and
U(us)).
The signature suggestion: s > min(U(ua), U(us)). The patch suggestion: add s >
min(ua, us) condition check before the data copy procedure. The example vulnerable
program is demonstrated in Figure 30.
For the data copy procedure that is implemented through nested loops, we have multiple
Loop Bounds as illustrated in Figure 9. The total number of loop iterations is the product
of the number of the outer loop iterations and the number of the inner loop iterations.
Equation 4.3 and Equation 4.4 show how to calculate the total number of loop iterations
and the total number of writes.
numIteration =
Loop Bound1 − iv1init
iv1update
×
Loop Bound2 − iv3init
iv3update
(4.3)
totalNumWrites = iv2update × numIteration (4.4)
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Similarly, a buffer overflow attack can happen when the attacker can control the Loop Bound1
or/and Loop Bound2 or/and the sizeof(dest).
The iv detection problem for nested loops has been studied very well by researchers[98].
We leave this as a future work to implement the iv detection for nested loops and then to
calculate the total number of writes by calling nested loops using Equation 4.4.
Other variables in Equation 3.3. In the basic case study, we assume the user input
can only control the Loop Bound and the vulnerable buffer size. However, it is possible
that the user input can control the other variables in Equation 3.3 including iv1init, iv2init,
startOffset, or even iv2update and iv1update. The example vulnerable program is demon-
strated in Figure 31.
Malicious Array Index. In the basic case study, we assume the buffer overflow attack
happens during a data coping process. It can also happen when the index of the vulnerable
buffer is controllable by the user input. Among the 377 vulnerabilities for which Microsoft
has issued security bulletins between 2003 and 2006, two applications are known using a field
from the user input as an array index without checking whether the array index is within the
array bound. ShieldGen[41] is a black-box approach for generating signatures for unknown
vulnerabilities. They are believed to be the scheme that can generate the highest quality
signatures and can cover the most situations comparing with any other existing approaches
(e.g. exploit based or execution based). However, ShieldGen[41] can’t handle the malicious
array index cases described above. They even can’t provide any information on this case.
This thesis work can provide more information on this famous notoriously hard problem.
In the BOVP detection step, we search back the trace for the latest instruction that does the
malicious write. If this instruction doesnt belong to any data copy procedure (programmer
written loops, known library or system functions), we will keep searching back until we find
one that is part of a data copy procedure as the BOVP or we find nothing. If we cant find any
BOVP, our diagnosis result will state that the vulnerability may belong to this unchecked
array index case. The example vulnerable program is demonstrated in Figure 32.
Other Loop Bound. In the basic cases, we assume the Loop Bound includes the two
major loop exit condition cases for a data copy procedure. One is source[i] == c and
the other is j < a. The Loop Bound is strlen(source|c) and a respectively. Is there any
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other Loop Bound for a data copy procedure? In paper[46], it presents a loop bound analysis
approach based on combination of standard program analysis techniques including program
slicing, abstract interpretation and invariant analysis. Here we use function φ() to represent
other Loop Bound cases. In Figure 33, we demonstrate the other Loop Bound case. We can
apply the technique described in paper[46] to analyze the bound results.
4.3 CASE STUDY IS COMPLETE
In this section, we prove that the above six basic cases and four categories of other cases can
cover all of the buffer overflow vulnerability cases.
Theorem. The six basic cases and the four category other cases cover all of the buffer
overflow vulnerability cases. The buffer overflow vulnerabilities are those that can be con-
trollable by the user inputs.
Proof by enumeration: The six basic cases are based on the following four assumptions:
• Assume the buffer overflow attack happens through a data copy procedure. This data
copy procedure is a code block that writes contents to a data array. It can be in any
format including the generalized data copy procedure (one or more loop exits), data copy
procedure implemented through nested loops, or sequential write statements.
• Assume the attacker can only control the sizeof(dest) or/and Loop Bound.
• Assume the Loop Bound includes the two major loop exit condition cases for a data
copy procedure. One is source[i] == c and the other is j < a. The Loop Bound is
strlen(source|c) and a respectively.
• Assume there is one Loop Bound or one loop exit condition of the data copy procedure.
So the generalized data copy procedure with multiple loop exits or data copy procedure
implemented through nested loops are excluded.
First we assume the buffer overflow attack happens through a data copy procedure which
can be in any format. If the buffer overflow happens through a data copy procedure, there
is a buffer overflow if and only if the sizeof(dest) is less than the total number of writes after
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the data copy process. So the attacker can attack the buffer overflow vulnerability through
controlling the sizeof(dest) or/and the total number of writes. We assume the attacker can
only control the Loop Bound to control the total number of writes. We also assume that
there is only one Loop Bound and the Loop Bound is either strlen(source|c) or a. We
can then construct the six basic cases as listed in Section 4.1.
By removing the first assumption ”Assume the buffer overflow attack happens through
a data copy procedure”, we get the first category of the other cases that buffer overflow
happens through malicous array index.
By removing the second assumption ”Assume the attacker can only control the sizeof(dest)
or/and Loop Bound”, we get the second category of the other cases that the buffer overflow
happens through controlling the other variables in Equation 3.3. From Equation 3.3, we can
see the total number of writes is determined by several variables including iv1init, iv2init,
startOffset, iv2update, iv1update and Loop Bound. So besides Loop Bound, the attacker can
also control iv1init, iv2init, startOffset, iv2update and iv1update to control the total number
of writes.
By removing the third assumption ”Assume the Loop Bound includes the two major
Loop Bounds”, we get third category of the other cases that buffer overflow happens through
other Loop Bound.
By removing the fourth assumption ”Assume there is one Loop Bound”, we get the fourth
category of the other cases that buffer overflow happens through a data copy procedure that
have multiple Loop bounds. This can be one of the two situations. One is that there are
multiple Loop Bounds in the generalized data copy procedure. The other is that the data
copy procedure is implemented through nested loops.
Now we cover the whole space of buffer overflow vulnerability cases that can be control-
lable by an attacker without any assumption. We conclude the buffer overflow case study
results, six basic cases and four categories of other cases, are complete.
39
hTable 1: The sample unsafe standard C libraries and system data copy functions study:
char* s1, s2, format; int n, socket, flags; File* stream;
Func. Dest. Loop Bound Unsafe
Name Buffer Condition
strcpy(s1, s2) s1 strlen(s2) sizeof(s1) < strlen(s2)
strncpy(s1, s2, n) s1 n sizeof(s1) < n
memcpy(s1, s2, n) s1 n sizeof(s1) < n
memset(s1, s2, n) s1 n sizeof(s1) < n
recv(socket, s1, n, flags) s1 n sizeof(s1) < n
4.4 STANDARD C LIBRARY FUNCTIONS AND SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
THAT CAN CAUSE BUFFER OVERFLOWS
There are many unsafe Standard C Library and system data copy functions that can cause
buffer overflow vulnerabilities. We studied those functions in advance and got the function
summaries. Once we meet a buffer overflow that is caused by any of those functions, we can
retrieve the vulnerable buffer and the total number of writes information directly.
In Table 1, we list sample standard C library and system data copy functions that can be
unsafe and that have been found causing buffer overflow vulnerabilities in our experiments
on real world vulnerable applications.
In Windows Vista, certain APIs are banned including strcpy, strncpy etc. However
memcpy is not on the banned APIs list which causes the stack buffer overflow in MS07-017[53].
From the table, we can see memcpy is actually as dangerous as strncpy. Our study can help
security engineers to decide which functions and under what conditions they are unsafe.
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION
In this Chapter, we discuss our implementation details. As the major contribution of this
thesis work is on the diagnosis engine, I will concentrate on the implementation details of
the diagnosis engine which is independently implemented by me. For the details on dynamic
analysis engine and static analysis engine, please refer to BitBlaze [5] project for details.
5.1 DYNAMIC ANALYSIS ENGINE
We have implemented the dynamic analysis engine, TEMU [5], on QEMU [13], a whole-
system emulator that uses dynamic translation techniques. At runtime, an instruction in
the guest system is translated into several micro operations, which are then executed in the
host system. This feature enables us to perform dynamic instrumentation on any instructions
in the guest system (including the instructions in the kernel space). To implement dynamic
taint analysis, we have extended these micro operations to propagate taint information. We
have also modified the virtual network device to taint the network input.
In addition, we instrument the beginning of each instruction. If it is from the examined
process, we disassemble it and record the runtime information, including the current program
pointer, the current instruction, and the states of its operands etc. If the operands are
tainted, we also record the taint information.
TEMU only provides hardware-level information about the guest system, such as CPU
and memory state. However, to determine if an instruction is from the examined process
or the kernel, we need software-level knowledge from the guest system. To achieve this, we
have developed a kernel module and load it into the guest system to obtain the necessary
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software-level information. This module is aware of the creation and deletion of processes.
When a new process is created, the kernel module obtains the value of current CR3 register.
As CR3 contains the physical address of the current process’s page table, it is different (and
unique) for each process. All this information is passed on to the dynamic analysis engine
through a predefined I/O port. Therefore, when instrumenting an instruction, we simply
check the current CR3 to determine if the examined process is running.
5.2 STATIC ANALYSIS ENGINE
The static analysis engine is implemented on top of our binary analysis framework, Vine[5],
which can disassemble an x86 binary, converts it into an intermediate representation (IR),
and perform serials of preprocessing on the raised IR program.
We translate the x86 program to the VinE modeling language [5]. This language simplifies
the analysis of complex x86 to that of a simple RISC-like language.
After we raise the x86 program to VinE modeling language, our static analysis engine will
perform serials of preprocessing of the raised program. Specifically, it will do constant prop-
agation, deadcode elimination, static single assignment (SSA) generation. It can generate
the control flow graph (CFG) of the raised IR program. It also provides the functionality of
program chopping and the forward symbolic program execution. It also provides the calling
information for the memory functions. Those memory functions include malloc, calloc and
free.
Symbolic Execution. The symbolic execution is used in our input analysis step. In
order to perform sound symbolic execution, we must correctly interpret the semantics and
effects of all assembly statements. The x86 instruction set is complex. Many instructions
have implicit side effects (e.g., add sets the eflags register on overflow), may have implicit
operands (e.g., the memory segment selector), may behave differently for different operands
(e.g., shifts by 0 do not set eflags), and there are even single instruction loops (e.g., rep
instructions). Thus, to reduce the complexity of the symbolic execution logic, for each
instruction that needs to be executed symbolically, we first translate it into a sequence
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of much simpler intermediate representation (IR) statements (VinE). Our IR resembles a
RISC-like assembly language. The translation from an x86 instruction to our IR is designed
to correctly model the semantics of the original x86 instruction, including making all the
implicit side effects explicit (e.g., setting the eflags register). We then perform symbolic
execution on the IR statements, instead of directly with the x86 instruction set.
5.3 DIAGNOSIS ENGINE
Besides detecting the BOVP by searching back the runtime traces to find out the latest
instruction that wrote the security critical data, our diagnosis engine performs three steps
analysis towards understanding the BOVC. These three steps analysis includes loop analysis,
bound analysis and input analysis.
The loop analysis includes loop detection, loop induction variable (iv) detection[66], loop
invariant and variant variable detection[16, 66], loop exit condition extraction, memory read
and memory write extraction. My loop detection can handle both of the reducible graph and
irreducible graph[89, 52]. My loop iv detection is based on the algorithm provided in[66]. My
loop invariant and loop variant variable detection is implemented based on its definition[66].
I return the code slicing of the loop body for each loop exit condition and each memory
write index if the write index is a loop variant variable. I also return the code slicing of
the memory read index if the loop exit condition is strlen(source|c). I then evaluate the
results for the loop exit condition and the memory write index on the sliced program.
Program slicing is a subset of the programs that contains the statements which can
affect the results of the interested variable(s)[96]. My slicing works on the IR program. I
apply data flow analysis to retrieve the code statements that are related with our interested
variables (e.g. loop exit condition, write index).
The bound analysis scans the runtime traces for two rounds. During the first round, it
estimates the stack range using the ESP values, the heap bound using the malloc returns.
The ESP is the stack pointer. Our runtime traces contain the current ESP in each instruction.
During the second round scan, we update the bit vector and instruction id array to represent
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the memory state updates to mark the memory object bounds. Those memory state updates
include the function call, function return, memory access, memory allocation and memory
deallocation. Our current memory function handling can only handle the calling conventions
we have met in our RedHat73 test bed. More calling conventions[6] can be extended for other
applications running on different platforms. For the windows applications we evaluated in
Section 6.2, we simply identify the vulnerable buffer location is on heap or on stack.
They calling conventions we can handle include passing arguments by register eax, by
pushing on stack either explicitly (e.g. push %eax) or implicitly (e.g. movl $0xa (%esp,
1)) and passing function return results using register eax. For example, for function malloc,
the function argument is the malloc size and the function return is the starting address of
the allocated memory. The meta data are accessed in the malloc function body; for function
free, the function argument is the starting address of the memory to be deallocated.
The input analysis returns the dynamic slicing of the runtime traces that contains the
malicious variables and then perform symbolic execution on the trace to see how the inputs
are related with the malicious variables.
5.3.1 Loop Detection
I did thorough study on the loop detection research area[89, 52, 33] and implemented the
loop detection algorithm in a comprehensive way given the Control Flow Graph(CFG) of
the vulnerable program. The implementation can handle both of the reducible graph and
irreducible graph cases[89, 52, 33]. This is much better than the BlackHat[3] community’s
approach and IDAPro’s[7] approach. The irreducible graph happens in practice when we
were testing our loop detection implementations.
A basic algorithm to detect loops is proposed in [16, 66], by applying dominator analysis.
Node d is the dominator of node n if every path from the entry node of CFG to n goes through
d. Briefly speaking, this algorithm works by calculating the dominators D(n) = d1, ..., di, ...
for each node n and testing if there is an edge from node n to node di. If there is such an
edge, then this edge is the back edge, node di is the loop head and node n is in the loop
body that returns to the loop head.
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This algorithm can only detect loops with single entries, reducible graph[89]. But in
practice, graphs contain loops with multiple entries, which are defined as irreducible graph,
happen. As Figure 10(a) shows, Loop 2 has two entries: Node 5 and 6. In this case, we apply
the node collapsing algorithm [52, 89] to determine if a CFG contains a loop with multiple
entries, and the node splitting algorithm [52, 89] to break such a loop. We then can make
an irreducible graph reducible.
Figure 10(c) shows the CFG after the node splitting algorithm is performed. The node
collapsing and node splitting procedures may be performed multiple times until the resulted
CFG contains no loops with multiple entries. In this example, after the first-time node
splitting procedure, we have already got a CFG containing no loops with multiple entries.
The final CFG is shown in Figure 10(d), in which Loop 2 has been broken to have a single
entry. Then we can perform the basic algorithm on this CFG to detect loops.
Figure 10: Examples of Transforming Irreducible Graph to Reducible Graph
Figure 11 illustrates the CFG of a real-world program, passlogd. Using the above
algorithms, we can identify two loops in this CFG. Now given the instruction 0x7801212f
that overwrites the returned address, we first locate that this instruction is in the block 135.
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Then with the information of identified loops, we can know that it is in Loop 1, which has
entry node 122.
Figure 11: The CFG of passlogd
5.3.2 Loop Induction Variable Detection
Our goal of loop analysis is to find out how the number of writes is determined by different
variables. Based on the observation that the loop memory accesses in a data copy procedure
are usually composed and the loop exit condition are usually controlled by loop induction
variables, I implemented loop induction variable detection.
Induction variables are discussed in detail in [66]. Basically they are variables that are
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updated through regular mathematics patterns during each loop iteration. The basic or
fundamental induction variables are those that are modified by some constant amount each
time, e.g. i = i + 4. The dependent induction variables are those that are linear equations
of the basic induction variable, e.g. j = a × i + b, where a and b are constants or loop
invariants.
The input of the induction variable detection is a loop body in Static Single Assignment(SSA)[66].
There are φ-statements, lhs = φ(a1, a2, ..., an) and single assignment statements, x = y when
both of the right hand side and left hand side are variables in our Vine IL. The existence of
these statements makes the induction variable detection extremely difficult. I modified the
algorithm given on the text book[66] to be able to handle this by creating a hashtable. The
key of the hashtable is a variable and the value is a list of variables that are the same through
the program propagation of that key variable. The algorithm finds the basic induction vari-
ables that are satisfied with pattern i = i ± a first, then recursively look for the dependent
inductive variables that match pattern k = m × a where a is a constant variable and m is
one of the new found inductive variables in the previous round. During the first iteration, m
is one of the basic induction variables. This iteration will continue until no new dependent
inductive variables can be found. The algorithm of the induction variable detection is given
in Table 2.
Using the implemented algorithm to handle the sample program block in x = x+ 1; z =
y×5; y = x+6; q = z×2;, it will find x as the basic induction variable. During the following
iterations, it will find y as a dependent induction variable in the first round, z in the second
round, q in the third round. During the fourth iteration, the result is empty, so the program
stops.
5.3.3 Loop Invariant and Variant Variables Analysis
In some situation, some variable is not an induction variable but we still want to know if
it is a loop variant or loop invariant variable. If a computation produces the same value in
every loop iteration, it is a loop invariant variable, otherwise, it is a loop variant variable.
This concept is defined well in Chapter 13.2[66].
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The definition of loop invariant variable is defined as below: A definition t = xy in a loop
is loop invariant if x and y are constants, or all reaching definitions of x and y are outside
the loop, only one definition reaches x (or y), and that definition is loop-invariant.
Based on this definition, I designed and implemented the algorithm to find loop invari-
ants and loop variants variables as below. During the first iteration of the loop body, for
each statement, if the right hand side variable(s) are constants or no-reaching definitions
in the loop body, they are saved in a list, say loop invariant1. During the next round of
iteration, we check the right hand value(s) that either both are members of loop invariant1,
or at least one is a member of loop invariant1, the other is either a constant or no-reaching
definition in the loop body. The lvalue of this statement is a loop invariant, we save them in
loop invariant2. This process will continue. For iteration i, we check the right hand value(s)
of each statement that either both are members of loop invariant(i-1) or at least one is a
member of loop invariant(i-1) and the other is a constant or no-reaching definition in the
loop body or a member of
⋃i−2
j=1(loop invariant(j)). This process will continue until no more
loop invariants can be found. By merging all of the lists, we obtain the final result of loop
invariants of the left hand values (lvalues).
The remaining left hand values are loop variants, we save them in a list named loop variants.
The algorithm of calculating the loop variant variables is given in Table 3. Now given a vari-
able, either a left hand value (lvalue) or a right hand value (rvalue), if it exits in loop variants
list, we say it is a loop variant variable, otherwise, we say it is a loop invariant variable. As
the same as in loop induction variable detection algorithm, I build a hashtable to handle
the φ-statement and single assignment statement when both of the right hand side and left
hand side are variables. Using this loop invariant and loop variant variables analysis, we can
find those variables that are not induction variables but are updating itself during each loop
iteration. These information is useful in the loop memory access pattern analysis.
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Table 2: The induction variable detection algorithm
Algorithm: Induction Variable Detection
1: Input: Loop body in SSA (single static assignment) format
2: Output: The induction variables of the loop body
3: i = 0;
4: while ((a = nextStatment(LoopBody)) != null)
5: if (patten(a) = patten(x = x ± i))
6: if (i = constant)
7: loop ivi∪ = x
8: while (loop ivi != null)
9: i++;
10: Init(LoopBody);
11: while ((a = nextStatment(LoopBody)) != null)
12: if (patten(a) = patten(y = z ± i))
13: if (i = constant and z ∈ loop ivi−1)
14: loop ivi∪ = y
15: if (patten(a) = patten(y = z × j))
16: if (j = constand and z ∈ loop ivi−1)
17: loop ivi∪ = y
18: for (j = 0; j ¡= i; j++)
19: loop iv∪ = loop ivi
20: return loop iv
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Table 3: The loop variant and loop invariant variable detection algorithm
Algorithm: loop variant and loop invariant variable detection
1: Input: loop body in SSA (single static assignment) format
2: Output: loop variant variables of the loop body
3: i = 0;
4: while ((a = nextStatment(LoopBody)) != null)
5: if (patten(a) = patten(x = i op j))
6: if (i,j = constant or have no reaching def)
7: loop invari∪ = x
8: while (loop invari != null)
9: i++;
10: Init(LoopBody);
11: while ((a = nextStatment(LoopBody)) != null)
12: if (patten(a) = patten(x = i op j))
13: if (i,j ∈ loop invari−1)
14: loop invari∪ = x
15: if (i ∈ loop invari−1 and j ∈ constant ∪ noreachingdef ∪ loop invar0,1,i−2)
16: loop invari∪ = x
17: if (j ∈ loop invari−1 and i ∈ constant ∪ noreachingdef ∪ loop invar0,1,i−2)
18: loop invari∪ = x
19: for (j = 0; j ≤ i; j++)
20: loop invar lhs∪ = loop invari
21: while (v = nextVariable(LoopBody) != null)
22: if (v /∈ loop invar lhs)
23: loop var∪ = x
24: return loop var
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6.0 EXPERIMENTS
In this Chapter, we evaluate our approach through several aspects. First, we evaluate how
our generalized loop structures can handle the loops in the real programs. The gener-
alized loop structures include the Generalized-data-copy-procedure, the Generalized-data-
copy-procedure with multiple loop exists and the data copy procedure implemented through
nested loops. They are illustrated in Figure 6, Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively. The real
programs we studied include the WCET (Worst Case Execution time) benchmark[14] and
several real world applications that have multiple known vulnerabilities. These several real
world applications include 3proxy, atphttpd, ghttpd, nullhttpd.
We also have performed a series of study on real world buffer overflow vulnerable ap-
plications to evaluate the effectiveness of our BOVD approach and to confirm our buffer
overflow vulnerability case study results. We use six representative examples to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our approach. Among the six examples, the PNG and RPC vulnerable
applications have data copy procedures implemented by programmers. Our loop heuristic
and loop analysis approach can handle them very well. We can correctly infer the result of
the total number of writes in Equation 3.3 for both of them. The cfingerd has a format
string vulnerability and the 3proxy has a double free vulnerability. We use them to demon-
strate the effectiveness of our approach to handle other memory corruption attacks. The
nullhttpd has a heap buffer overflow vulnerability that the user can control the vulnerable
buffer size and the SQL has a stack buffer overflow vulnerability. We use them to demonstrate
the effusiveness of our bound analysis approach. In Section 6.3, we list all of the applications
we have studied and classify them using our buffer overflow vulnerability case study results.
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6.1 LOOP STRUCTURE STUDY
We studied the loops of real programs to see how well they can be evaluated through our
generalized loop procedures. For those loops that have write statements that are indexed
through loop variant variables, we classify them as data copy loops. Otherwise, they are
non-data copy loops. For data copy loops, we evaluated them through the accuracy of the
calculated total number of loop iterations and the total number of writes. For non-data
copy loops, we evaluated them through the accuracy of the calculated total number of loop
iterations using the Equation 3.1, Equation 3.2, Equation 4.3, Equation 4.4, Equation 4.1
and Equation 4.2.
The real programs we studied include the WCET benchmark[46] and some real world
applications. The WCET benchmark programs are maintained by the Mlardalen WCET
research group. The benchmarks are collected from several different research groups and
tool vendors around the world. Each benchmark is provided as a C source file (file.c). In
Table 4, we list the description and number of lines of C code of each program of the WCET
benchmark.
The real world applications we studied include 3proxy, atphttpd, ghttpd and nullhttpd.
In Table 5, we list the brief descriptions, the programs and the number of lines of C code for
each program.
Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 list all of the evaluation results. They all use the same
notation as described in Table 6. Among those notations, (a)(b)(c) are for non-data copy
loops and (d)(e)(f) are for data copy loops. The three categories of each group are used to
distinguish loop with one exit, loop with multiple loop exits (non-nested loop) and nested
loops. The (1)(2)(3)(4) are for the four situations that we can accurately estimate the
number of loop iterations; we can’t accurately estimate the number of loop iterations; we
can accurately estimate the total number of writes; we can’t accurately estimate the total
number of writes. For non-data copy loops, we evaluate them through the number of loop
iterations only, so only (1)(2) are evaluated.
We summarize the loop structure study results for real world applications on Figure 12
and for WCET benchmark on Figure 13. We list the results of both in Figure 14 to compare
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Table 4: The WCET benchmark programs (loop structure study source 1)
Program Description number of lines of C Code
adpcm Adaptive pulse code modulation algorithm 875
bs Binary Search in an array of 15 integer elements 113
bsort100 bubble sort benchmark program 127
cnt Counts non-negative numbers in a matrix 128
compress data compression program, adopted from SPEC95 506
cover Program for testing many paths 238
crc Cyclic redundancy check computation on 40 data bytes 125
duff Using Duff’s device to copy 43 bytes array 83
edn Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filter calculations 284
expint Series expansion computing an exponential integral 156
fac Recursive program to calculate factorials 25
fdct Fast Discrete Cosine Transform 238
fft1 Fast Fourier Transform using Cooly-Turkey algorithm 218
fibcall Iterative Fibonacci, used to calculate fib(30) 71
fir Finite impulse response filter (signal processing) 274
inssort Insertion sort on a reversed array of size 10 89
jcomplex Nested loop program 60
jfdctint Discrete-cosine transformation on 8*8 pixel block 374
lcdnum Read ten values, output half to LCD 62
ludcmp LU decomposition algorithm 149
matmult Matrix multiplication of two 20*20 matrices 162
minver Matrix inversion for 3x3 floating point matrix 197
ndes Embedded code with many complex bit operations 230
ns Search in a multi-dimensional array 531
nsichneu Simulates an extended Petri net 4246
prime Search in a multi-dimensional array 45
qsort-exam Linear equations by LU decomposition 118
qurt Root computation of quadratic equations 164
select Select the n:th largest number in floating point array 111
sqrt Square root function implemented by Taylor series 73
st This program computes for two arrays of numbers the 157
sum, the mean, the variance, and standard deviation,
the correlation coefficient between the two arrays
statement Automatic generated code 1273
ud Linear equations by LU decomposition 160
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Table 5: Some real world applications (loop structure study source 2)
Application Description Program number of lines of C Code
3proxy tiny free proxy common.c 608
server datatypes.c 798
dighosts.c 137
dnspr.c 196
total number of lines of C Code 1739
atphttpd simplistic, memory http handler.c 247
caching web server main.c 343
mime.c 73
sockhelp.c 343
total number of lines of C Code 1006
ghttpd a fast and efficient main.c 235
HTTP server that has protocol.c 329
CGI support util.c 241
total number of lines of C Code 805
nullhttpd a free, lightweight cgi.c 315
HTTP server that has config.c 165
CGI support, not a files.c 151
production server format.c 181
http.c 289
main.c 91
server.c 603
win32.c 231
total number of lines of C Code 2026
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Table 6: The loop analysis results for the real world applications: (1) can handle the number
of loop iterations; (2) can’t handle the number of loop iterations; (3) can handle the total
number of writes; (4) can’t handle the total number of writes; (a) Non-Data Copy Loop: one
loop exit; (b) Non-Data Copy Loop: multiple loop exits; (c) Non-Data Copy Loop: nested
loops; (d) Data Copy Loop: one loop exit; (e) Data Copy Loop: multiple loop exits; (f) Data
Copy Loop: nested loops.
Application Non-Data Copy Loops Data Copy Loops
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
(1) 2 1 0 3 1 0
3proxy (2) 6 3 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 1 1 0
(4) - - - 2 0 0
(1) 6 0 0 3 0 0
atphttpd (2) 3 1 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 2 0 0
(4) - - - 1 0 0
(1) 0 2 0 2 2 0
ghttpd (2) 1 5 0 0 1 0
(3) - - - 2 2 0
(4) - - - 0 1 0
(1) 17 0 0 4 1 0
nullhttpd (2) 12 2 0 1 0 0
(3) - - - 4 1 0
(4) - - - 1 0 0
(1) 25 3 0 12 4 0
total (2) 22 11 0 1 1 0
(3) - - - 9 4 0
(4) - - - 4 1 0
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Table 7: The loop analysis results for WCET benchmark (I).The same notation as in Table 6.
Application (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Application (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
(1) 9 0 0 9 0 0 (1) 0 0 0 0 0 0
adpcm (2) 1 1 0 0 0 0 bs (2) 1 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 9 0 0 (3) - - - 0 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 0 0 0 1 0 1 (1) 0 0 1 0 0 0
bsort100 (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 cnt (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 1 0 1 (3) - - - 0 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 0 0 0 3 2 0 (1) 2 0 0 0 0 0
compress (2) 2 0 0 0 0 0 cover (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 3 2 0 (3) - - - 0 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 2 0 0 1 0 0 (1) 0 0 0 1 0 0
crc (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 duff (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 1 0 0 (3) - - - 1 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 3 0 0 2 0 3 (1) 2 0 2 0 0 0
edn (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 expint (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 2 0 2 (3) - - - 0 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 1 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 1 0 0 0 0 0 (1) 3 0 0 0 0 0
fac (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 fdct (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 0 0 0 (3) - - - 0 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 3 0 0 3 0 1 (1) 0 1 0 0 0 0
fft1 (2) 1 0 0 0 0 0 fibcall (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 2 0 0 (3) - - - 0 0 0
(4) - - - 1 0 1 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 0 0 1 0 0 0 (1) 0 0 0 0 0 0
fir (2) 0 1 0 0 0 0 inssort (2) 0 0 1 0 0 0
(3) - - - 0 0 0 (3) - - - 0 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1) 1 0 0 2 0 0
jcomplex (2) 0 0 1 0 0 0 jfdctint (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 0 0 0 (3) - - - 1 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 1 0 0
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Table 8: The loop analysis results for WCET benchmark (II).The same notation as in
Table 6.
Application (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Application (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
(1) 1 0 0 0 0 0 (1) 5 0 0 3 0 0
lcdnum (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 lms (2) 2 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 0 0 0 (3) - - - 3 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 0 0 0 2 0 2 (1) 0 0 0 0 0 2
ludcmp (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 matmult (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 2 0 2 (3) - - - 0 0 2
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 0 0 1 1 0 3 (1) 9 0 0 3 0 0
minver (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 ndes (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 1 0 3 (3) - - - 2 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 1 0 0
(1) 0 0 1 0 0 0 (1) 1 0 0 0 0 0
ns (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 nsichneu (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 0 0 0 (3) - - - 0 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 1 0 0 0 0 0 (1) 0 0 0 0 0 1
prime (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 qsort-exam (2) 0 0 1 0 0 0
(3) - - - 0 0 0 (3) - - - 0 0 1
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 1 0 0 0 0 0 (1) 0 0 0 0 0 0
qurt (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 select (2) 0 0 0 0 0 1
(3) - - - 0 0 0 (3) - - - 0 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 1
(1) 1 0 0 0 0 0 (1) 3 0 0 1 0 0
sqrt (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 st (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 0 0 0 (3) - - - 1 0 0
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1) 0 0 2 0 0 2
statement (2) 1 0 0 0 0 0 ud (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 0 0 0 (3) - - - 0 0 2
(4) - - - 0 0 0 (4) - - - 0 0 0
(1) 49 1 8 32 2 16 0 0 0 0 0 0
total (2) 7 2 3 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) - - - 29 2 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4) - - - 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
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the result differences. On Figure 12, we can see our generalized data copy procedure can
handle data copy loops with analysis accuracy around 80%. This is much better than when
they are applied for handling non-data copy loops. The same trend can be seen on Figure 13.
Overall, our generalized data copy procedures can handle data copy loops with very high
analysis accuracy. This result is very encouraging.
Figure 12: The loop structure study result for real world applications
Figure 13: The loop structure study result for WCET Benchmark
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Figure 14: Compare the loop structure study results for WCET benchmark and real world
applications
6.2 REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES
PNG heap buffer Overflow (Bugtrap ID#1394) PNG (Portable Network Graphics)
is a file format for images utilized by many programs. Each PNG image contains a series
of required or optional chunks, e.g. PLTE, tRNS etc. Each chunk contains a length field.
If the length of the tRNS chunk and the length of the PLTE entries don’t match, a buffer
overflow may happen due to the lack of the length field validation check in the vulnerable
application.
In our approach, we first find the BOVP using our diagnosis engine. It is a write instruc-
tion inside of function processTRNS. We then do the loop analysis of that function. This is
a programmer written data copy procedure. There is one loop exit condition, iv < a. The
iv has init value 0 and pattern iv += 1.
Two of the total four memory writes are indexed by loop variant variables and these two
variables are the same. They are interesting to us. They write one byte each time. They are
actually two write instructions on the two branches inside of the loop body. Since they have
the same index, this won’t affect our analysis results. The loop variant variable equals iv +
b where the iv is the same iv in the loop exit condition and the b is a loop invariant. This
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loop invariant variable actually states the starting address of the vulnerable buffer. From
this loop analysis, we can infer the total number of writes after the loop execution is a using
Equation 3.3. We return the instruction addresses of the loop exit condition, the memory
write instructions that we extracted to the bound analysis step.
In the bound analysis step, we get the taint information for a and the value of b. The
variable a is tainted and the value of b shows that the vulnerable buffer is located on heap.
In the input analysis step, we obtained the dynamic slicing contains this a variable and
then performed the symbolic execution on the traces. With the data format information (we
assume it is given here), this variable a is actually the length field of tRNS chunk.
The above diagnosis results can help the security engineers understand the vulnerability
pretty well. They can realize that the length field of tRNS chunk needs to be validated
because that determines the total number of bytes written to the vulnerable buffer. The
PNG format specification[8] states that the tRNS chunk must not contain more alpha values
than there are palette entries. The real patch actually checks the number of alpha values
with the palette entries before the data copy procedure.
Windows DCOM RPC (MS03-026) The Windows DCOM RPC vulnerability is a
stack buffer overflow vulnerability in Microsoft’s DCOM RPC service. This is the other
example that have a data copy procedure implemented by programmer.
In our approach, we first find the BOVP. It is a write instruction inside of function
GetMachineName. We then do the loop analysis of that function. This is a programmer
written data copy procedure. The loop exit condition is source[i] = ’\’. The read index
is composed by an iv variable, which has init value 0 and pattern iv+=2. There is only one
memory write instruction in the loop body that is indexed by a loop variant variable. This
loop variant variable equals iv + b. The iv is the same iv variable for the read index i and
the b is a loop invariant variable which states the starting address of the vulnerable buffer.
From this loop analysis, we can infer the total number of writes of this data copy procedure
is strlen(source|\). We return the instruction addresses of the loop exit condition, the
memory write statement to the bound analysis step.
In the bound analysis step, we get the tainted information of source and the value of b.
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The source is tainted and the value b indicates that the vulnerable buffer is on stack. In this
example, there are no local variables allocated between the vulnerable buffer and the return
address, Old EBP. Our bound analysis approach can find the bound results efficiently and
accurately, which is 32 bytes.
In the input analysis step, we get the dynamic slicing of the traces that contains the
source variable and then perform the forward symbolic execution on the traces. With the
format information (we assume it is given), this string region corresponds to a Name field.
We can generate the signature directly for this example: strlen(Name) ≤ 32.
nullhttpd heap buffer overflow (Bugtrap ID#5774) The nullhttpd[9] is a small
multithreaded web server. It has a remote heap buffer overflow vulnerability. This is a very
good example belong to buffer overflow vulnerability Case V.
In our approach, we first find the BOVP. It is a write instruction belong to recv function
call. We know the functionality of this function in advance. We omit the loop analysis step.
In the bound analysis step, we get the tainted information of the third parameter, the
length field n, and the value of the second parameter, the starting address of the destination
buffer. The n is untainted which has constant value 1024. The starting address of the
vulnerable buffer states that it is located on heap. In our memory allocation history, we
successfully find the malloc record that does this memory allocation. The bound result is
the same as the malloc size, so we infer the parameter of the malloc determines the vulnerable
buffer size. Further investigation indicates that this parameter is tainted.
In the input analysis step, we get the dynamic slicing of the traces that contains the
malloc parameter variable and then perform the forward symbolic execution on the trace.
The malloc parameter equals a + 1024 where a is a length field.
We can generate the signature directly for this example: lengthField > 0.
Microsoft SQL Server (MS02-039) This SQL vulnerability is a stack buffer overflow
vulnerability in SQL server 2000 Resolution service (SSRS). The SQL Slammer worm attacks
this vulnerability.
In our approach, we first find the BOVP. It is a write instruction belong to sprintf
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function call. We know the functionality of this function in advance. We omit the loop
analysis step.
In the bound analysis step, we get the tainted information of the format string and the
value of the first parameter, the starting address of the vulnerable buffer. The format string
is untainted, so we can confirm that this is not a format string vulnerability. The starting
address of the vulnerable buffer states that the vulnerable buffer is located on stack. Our
bound analysis can accurately find the bound information for this vulnerable buffer which
is 132 bytes. The format string has length 40 bytes.
In the input analysis step, we get the dynamic slicing of the traces that contains the
vararg parameter for the sprintf function and then perform symbolic execution on the
trace. It is a name field.
We can generate the signature directly for this example: strlen(nameField) ≤ 92.
cfingerd format string vulnerability (Bugtrap ID#2576) cfingerd is a finger dae-
mon that contains a format string vulnerability in older versions. We test this vulnerability
on version 1.4.1.
In our approach, we first find the BOVP. It is a write instruction belong to SYSLOG
function call. We know the functionality of this function in advance. We omit the loop
analysis step.
In the bound analysis step, we get the tainted information of the format string. The for-
mat string is tainted. Further investigation indicates that there is no vararg in this function
call. We can then restrict the number of directives of the format string as 0.
3proxy double free vulnerability (Bugtrap ID#26180) 3proxy is a tiny proxy
server which is prone to a double-free memory-corruption vulnerability in older versions. We
test this vulnerability on 3proxy-0.5.3i. The double free vulnerability crashed the program.
We analyzed the traces collected before the program crash. In our free function call history,
two free function calls have the same parameter value, the starting address of the memory
region to free. And there isn’t a new malloc record between the two function calls corre-
sponding to this memory region. We confirm it is a double free vulnerability and we return
62
the two free function call records as the diagnosis results.
We summarize our signature results for buffer overflow vulnerability applications in Ta-
ble 9.
Table 9: Signature results for buffer overflow vulnerable applications
Vulnerable Application Signature Result
Windows DCOM RPC strlen(nameField) ≤ 32
Microsoft SQL Server strlen(nameField) ≤ 92
nullhttpd lengthField > 0
PNG(MS05025) lengthField(tRNS) ≤ lengthF ield(PLTE)
3
In Table 10, we list our performance results. All the numbers are in seconds. The
BOVP detection is mainly consumed by the dynamic-taint analysis and the BOVC is mainly
consumed by the disassembling process. For windows applications, the traces are very huge
which take longer time for the BOVP detection.
Table 10: The performance evaluation
Vulnerable Application BOVP Detection (sec) BOVC Analysis (sec)
Windows DCOM RPC 100.83 56.78
Microsoft SQL Server 77.51 35.16
nullhttpd 1.33 20.05
PNG(MS05025) 637.82 27.37
cfingerd 44.14 24.79
3proxy 1.59 18.52
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Now, I use the Windows DCOM RPC vulnerability to demonstrate the diagnosing pro-
cess. The Windows DCOM RPC is attacked by the record-setting blaster worm.
Figure 15 lists partial of the runtime traces. We can see the return address is tainted. An
attack detection alarm is raised by the dynamic analysis engine. We search back the trace to
find the latest instruction that overwrote the return address. This instruction is the BOVP.
Using loop detection, we locate the loop that contains this BOVP. This loop is illustrated
in Figure 16. In Figure 17, we can see how our loop analysis retrieve the program slicing of
the loop exit condition and memory read and memory write indexes and conclude the total
number of writes information using Equation 3.2. The loop analysis result is illustrated in
Figure 18. The read instruction address and write instruction address are inputs to the
bound analysis step. Figure 19 illustrates this process. We check the taint status of the
read-in value which is tainted. We obtain the starting address of the vulnerable buffer and
calculate the bound result. The bound result is listed in Figure 20.
Figure 15: The BOVP detection for Windows DCOM RPC
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Figure 16: The Loop detection for Windows DCOM RPC
Figure 17: The Loop Analysis for Windows DCOM RPC
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Figure 18: The Loop Result for Windows DCOM RPC
Figure 19: The Bound Analysis for Windows DCOM RPC
Figure 20: The Bound Result for Windows DCOM RPC
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Table 11: The buffer overflow case study on real world applications
Vulnerable Application Vulnerability Function Data Copy Procedure Buffer Overflow Cases
CSRSS(MS05018) DoFontEnum wcscpy Case I
CSRSS(MS06040) CanonicalizePathname wcscpy Case I
atphttpd http send error sprintf Case I
ghttpd Log sprintf Case I
Windows DCOM RPC GetMachineName programmer written Case I
Microsoft SQL Server sub42cfbf57 sprintf Case I
ANI(MS07017) LoadAnilIcon memcpy Case IV
Samba call trans2open strncpy Case IV
nullhttpd ReadPOSTData recv Case V
PNG(MS05025) processTRNS programmer written Case VI
6.3 BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY CASE STUDY
In Table 11, we list the real world buffer overflow vulnerable applications we studied. We
classify them based on our buffer overflow vulnerability case study results. The six basic
cases cover all of the real world buffer overflow vulnerable applications we studied. We found
real world buffer overflow vulnerabilities belonging to Case I, Case IV, Case V and Case VI.
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7.0 DISCUSSION
In this Chapter, we discuss our approach through various aspects. We discuss the complex
loop cases that will affect our analysis results. We analyze the advantages and the potential
limitations of our bound analysis approach. We discuss how our BOVD approach can’t be
affected by the memory aliasing and indirect jumps in binary program analysis. We do
some quantitative analysis of data copy procedure vs. buffer overflow. We perform the false
negative analysis and false positive analysis of the signature results using our current input
analysis approach. After that, we discuss about the situations that we can’t handle.
7.1 COMPLEX LOOP CASES
There are several complex loop cases that will affect our analysis results. They include:
1). There are conditional branch in the loop body. And the written index variable of the
vulnerable buffer or the loop iteration variable are updated differently in each conditional
branch. 2). The data copy procedure is implemented through sequential loops. 3). The loop
exits and the number of writes can’t be handled using our loop structures. The next few
Sections discuss each of them in detail.
7.1.1 Conditional Branch in loop.
When there is a conditional branch in the loop body, especially when vulnerable buffer write
index variable and loop iteration variable are updated differently in each conditional branch,
we can’t obtain the accurate analysis results of the total number of writes after the loop
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execution. We do some approximation to conservatively estimate the total number of writes.
When the write index variable is updated differently on each conditional branch, we use the
one that is updated (incremented or decremented) larger to estimate the number of writes
in each loop iteration, max(iv2update1, iv2update2). When the loop iteration variable is up-
dated differently on each conditional branch, we use the one that is updated (incremented or
decremented) smaller to estimate the number of loop iterations, min(iv1update1, iv1update2.
The final estimated total number of writes is greater than or equal to the real total number
of writes.
iv1 = iv1init;
iv2 = iv2init;
while (iv1 < Loop_Bound){
if (condition){
writeAddress = startAddress + startOffset + iv2;
[writeAddress] = {some value};
iv2 += iv2upate1;
iv1 += iv1upate1;
}else{
writeAddress = startAddress + startOffset + iv2;
[writeAddress] = {some value};
iv2 += iv2upate2;
iv1 += iv1upate2;
}
}
Figure 21: The data copy procedure that has the memory write index variable and loop
iteration variable updated differently in each conditional branch.
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7.1.2 Sequential Loops.
We met sequential loops when we were evaluating our loop analysis approach using some
Standard C Library functions including memset, memcpy, strncpy. This happens during the
compiler optimization process. The first loop writes four bytes at a time. The following
loops finish the remaining. If it happens in a programmer written data copy procedure,
we use memory traces information to handle this situation. In our loop analysis step, we
actually find all of the loops of the vulnerable function. We assign each memory write
instruction inside of loops with an instruction id composed by the function name and the
loop id. This loop id distinguishes the loop that contains this memory write instruction. In
the bound analysis process, when we mark the bit vector for each memory write, we compare
the instruction id with the one on the previous position. If they contain the same function
name, we ignore the bit vector update. At the same time, we update the instruction id
array for the corresponding memory write. With this information, we can know if a block
of memory writes are happened in loops within the same function. We then look for the
memory space before the first memory write of the vulnerable loop that contains the BOVP.
If that memory space is written by an instruction with an id that has the same function name
but different loop id, we will infer these two memory space belong to the same buffer. This
process will continue until we find the first memory write in the first loop of the vulnerable
function which is the starting address of the vulnerable buffer. The Loop Bound is still
obtained from the loop that contains the BOVP. In Figure 22, we demonstrate how the
sequential loops are handled in bound analysis step.
7.1.3 Loop exits and number of writes we can’t handle.
In Section 3.3.1, we come up with the Generalized data copy procedure as illustrated in
Figure 6 and we answer the total number of writes information using Equation 3.1 and
Equation 3.2. In Section 4.2, we discussed the two situations that have multiple loop exits.
One is in nested loops. The other is in non-nested loop. The two situations are illustrated
in Figure 8 and Figure 9. We solve them through Equation 4.3, Equation 4.4, Equation 4.1,
Equation 4.2 respectively.
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In Section 6.1, we evaluate the above solutions using loops in real programs. We can
handle most of the loops especially data-copy loops. However, there are loops that we can’t
provide the accurate number of loop iterations or we can answer the number of loop iterations
correctly but we can’t answer the total number of writes correctly. Here, I list the cases that
we can’t handle using our loop structures:
• Loop bound is a result of a function.
• The iteration variable is updated irregularly. For example, updated by the result of a
function.
• The existence of break statement is a big challenge.
• The write statement does not write continuously to an array, but write to a member of
a struct array.
7.2 BOUND ANALYSIS DISCUSSION.
Our bound analysis approach can guarantee coarse-grained bound analysis results on stack
and heap. It can provide fine-grained bound results for majority of the cases. However, there
are situations that it can’t provide the fine-grained bound results:
Figure 22: The Memory Map for Sequential Loops
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• Variable access sequence matters. Even though we believe we can overwrite those vari-
ables that haven’t been written, other exploitable path may have different variable access
sequence.
• There may be some security critical data on Data region that has been initialized by the
program. We can’t detect its bound and it can be overwritten by rewriting some other
global variables located before it.
However, our bound analysis approach has a very good side effect that it can be used to
diagnose double free vulnerabilities as discussed in Section 3.4. The double free vulnerability
diagnosis result is much more helpful than the results returned by most of the current
systems. The current systems can detect that there is a double free on which memory
address. We can return which two free calls can cause a double free.
Our current implementation can only handle the calling conventions of the malloc and
free functions on our testbed RedHat73. We will extend our implementation to handle
more calling conventions in future.
7.3 THE EFFECT OF MEMORY ALIASING AND INDIRECT JUMPS.
As there isn’t a perfect solution for memory aliasing analysis for x86 binary programs,
we can’t guarantee the detection of the iv when it is accessed and maintained through
memory load and store. However, as an iv is updated through each loop iteration, it is more
reasonable to store it in a register by compiler optimization. The real world programs, which
have programmer written data copy procedures and that had been discussed in Section 6.2,
use registers to store the iv variables.
We use program control flow graph (CFG) as an input to do the loop detection. Due to
the existence of indirect jumps, our CFG can’t represent the program flow precisely when
indirect jumps exist. In that case, we may not be able to find the loop that does the data
copy. However, we look for loops implemented by programmers that do the data copy which
rarely have case switch statements, virtual functions etc. to cause indirect jumps.
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7.4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS.
We do this analysis based on the data we collected from ShieldGen[41] since most of the
vulnerability information is not publicly available. Even in ShieldGen[41], they can’t find
enough information for 89 vulnerabilities.
Quantitative analysis of input triggered vulnerabilities. In Table 12, we list the
total number of vulnerabilities collected that have been issued on Microsoft security bulletins
between 2003 and 2006 and the number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited by inputs.
Our diagnosis approach is designed to diagnose the vulnerabilities triggered by inputs.
Table 12: The Quantitative analysis of input triggered vulnerabilities
Total Number of Vulnerabilities 377
Not Enough Information 89
With Enough Information to Classify 288
Vulnerabilities Triggered by Inputs 157
Denial of Service 55
Access Control 25
Scripting Problem 17
Miscellaneous Problem 34
Percentage of Vulnerabilities Triggered by Inputs 54.5%
Quantitative analysis of data copy procedure vs. buffer overflow
In ShieldGen[41], 25 vulnerabilities are selected to do the pencil-and-paper detail analysis.
Among the 25 vulnerabilities, two cases are applications using a field from the input as an
index into an array without checking whether the index falls within the bounds of the array.
These are the buffer overflow cases that the buffer overflow doesn’t happen through the data
copy process. This unchecked array index is one of the cases that ShieldGen[41] can’t handle
and this is the case our diagnosis results can’t provide precise results. Our diagnosis result can
state that the vulnerability may belong to this case, but we can’t provide bound information
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since we can’t locate the data copy procedure easily without any extra specification. In
Table 13, we display the data information.
Table 13: The Quantitative analysis of data copy procedure vs. buffer overflow
Sample Size 25
Through Unchecked Array Index 2
Through Data Copy Procedure 23
Percentage of Data Copy Procedure triggers buffer overflow 92%
Besides the unchecked array indices’s cases, there are some other situations that the
ShieldGen[41] can’t handle which includes 1) combined length of two separate strings in the
input exceeds a certain limit 2) the value of one integer field in the input is larger than the
value of another integer field 3) the application uses a collection of old buffers. All of them
are not a problem to us. Our PNG example belongs to case 2. For case 3, it is also not a
problem to us since we can find the buffer bound. In Table 14, we compare the precision
results of our approach with ShieldGen[41].
Table 14: Compare the coverage of our approach with ShieldGen’s
ShieldGen Approach Our Diagnosis Approach
Precise Filter 19 23
Imprecise Filter 6 2
Total 25 25
Precision Coverage 76% 92%
7.5 FALSE NEGATIVE AND FALSE POSITIVE ANALYSIS FOR
SIGNATURE GENERATION.
We will analyze the false negatives and false positives of the generated signature results using
our current input analysis approach.
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Our bound analysis approach can generate the fine-grained bound analysis results through
the memory access analysis of the runtime traces. Our results won’t lead to the false neg-
atives generated in ShieldGen[41] due to the coarse-grained bound results. However, in our
input analysis step, we only examine the execution path executed by the given exploit and
we only examine how the user inputs are related with the malicious variables. We can’t
generate the input condition to guarantee reaching the vulnerability point. If by changing
some input variables, the vulnerability point isn’t reachable but the input variables that are
related with the malicious variables (e.g. source buffer, destination buffer size or iteration
variable) are still satisfy the vulnerability condition, our signature results will lead to false
positives. Also, if there is another exploitable execution path and if the relationship of the
user inputs to the vulnerability condition is different, our signature results will lead to false
negatives.
Please see Section 8.2 for further discussion on how to enhance the current input analysis
approach to achieve generating signatures with zero false positives and zero false negatives.
7.6 SITUATIONS WE CAN’T HANDLE PRECISELY.
Our approach assumes the buffer overflow attack happens through some data copy procedure
(either programmer implemented, or some library or system functions). If it is a programmer
implemented data copy procedure, it is implemented through loop structures instead of fix
number of write statements.
In ShieldGen[41], two of the 377 vulnerabilities collected are known using some input field
as an index to access the array, our approach won’t be able to diagnose them precisely. So
far, in our BOVP analysis step, we search back the trace for the latest instruction that does
the malicious write. If this instruction isn’t belong to any data copy procedure (programmer
written loops, known library or system functions), we will keep searching back until we
find one that is part of a data copy procedure as the BOVP or find nothing. If we can’t
find the BOVP, our diagnosis result will state that the vulnerability may be belong to this
unchecked array index case. However, we can’t provide precise bound information since
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we can’t locate the data copy procedure easily without any extra specification. Also, if the
data copy procedure is implemented using fixed number of write statements, we can’t locate
it using current loop detection approach. We won’t be able to diagnose the total number of
writes information.
Our current input analysis approach returns the dynamic slicing of the run-time traces
and then performs the symbolic execution to figure out how the user inputs are related
with those malicious variables. So, only one execution path is examined. The signatures
generated through this approach can lead to low false negatives and low false positives.
Those low false positives happen when other input fields can change the execution path and
make the vulnerability point unreachable. However, we can also return the static slicing of
the program that contains the malicious variables which can greatly reduce the workload of
the security engineers to diagnose the vulnerability and to generate the accurate signatures
more efficiently. Please see Section 8.2 for detail discussion on how to enhance the current
input analysis approach to achieve generating signatures with zero false positives and zero
false negatives.
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8.0 APPLICATION
The results of the automatic buffer overflow vulnerability diagnosis can have many applica-
tions. First, it can help the security engineers to understand why the program is vulnerable.
With the diagnosis information, the security engineers can fix the buggy program and gener-
ate the accurate patches more efficiently. Second, the results of the loop analysis and bound
analysis can be applied for automatic patch generation. Third, the results of all the three
steps analysis can be applied for signature generation and exploit generation. In this sec-
tion, I discuss the application of the vulnerability diagnosis on patch generation, signature
generation and exploit generation.
8.1 PATCH GENERATION
Sidiroglou et al. propose automatic patch generation to defend against network worms[82].
They use ProPolice[47] to detect the buffer overflow vulnerability. They then apply some
heuristics to do the patch generation. Those heuristics include: 1) moving the offending
buffer to heap; 2) new version of malloc that allocates two additional pages. Their approach
can mitigate the vulnerability but can’t provide a satisfiable patch due to lack of semantic
information of the vulnerability.
With the loop analysis and bound analysis results, we can generate more effective patches
by restricting the number of writes of the data copy procedure less than the destination buffer
size. This can be achieved through binary rewriting.
There are plenty of binary rewriting tools[87, 64, 77, 12, 32, 54] available in academia.
ATOM[87] and EEL[64] are designed for RISC computer architecture. Etch[77] is primar-
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ily an optimization tool for rewriting Win32/Intel PE executable. LEEL[12] works on
inux/x86 binaries. However, it can’t handle the indirect control and arbitrary code/data
mixing. UQBT[32] is a static binary translation framework which is architecture indepen-
dent. Detours[54] is for run-time binary interception of Win32 functions.
Researchers have actually proposed defense against attacks through binary rewriting
approach[75]. However, their approach achieves the same level of protection as compiler-
based approach for stack buffer overflow defense by protecting return address.
In summary, we can generate more effective patches automatically using our diagnosis
results.
8.2 SIGNATURE GENERATION
Compared with software patches, signature-based defense can respond faster and is less
intrusive to a system since applying and removing a signature does not affect the normal
operation of a running system. As a result, signature-based defense becomes an important
initial response to zero-day attacks. A key requirement to signature-based defense against
zero-day attacks is to automatically generate signatures that have low false positives and
low false negatives given an exploit to the vulnerability. Signatures with high false negatives
can be evaded by polymorphic mutations of exploits. Signatures with high false positives
will block legitimate inputs. Due to the importance of it, researchers have addressed this
problem through many different approaches[60, 70, 40, 84, 61, 24, 26, 35, 34]. However, none
of them is satisfiable.
Here, we discuss how to achieve the zero-false positive and zero-false negative signature
generation by enhancing this thesis work.
Our bound analysis approach can generate the fine-grained bound analysis results through
the memory access analysis of the runtime traces. Our results won’t lead to the false nega-
tives that ShieldGen[41] generates due to ShieldGen generates coarse-grained bound results.
However, in our input analysis step, we only examine the execution path executed by the
given exploit. Using symbolic execution and path slicing[55] as proposed in both Vigilante[35]
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and Bouncer[34], we can generate the input condition to reach the vulnerability point on that
execution path. Combining the input condition to reach the vulnerability point, the vulner-
ability condition (how the user inputs are related with the buffer overflow condition) and the
fine-grained bound results, we can generate accurate signature results for the execution path
executed by the given exploit. This result is pretty good comparing with any of the existing
approaches. However, it can’t handle the situation when there is a different execution path
and on the other execution path, the input condition to reach the vulnerability point and
the vulnerability condition are different from the previous results. We can handle this by
generating signatures cumulatively. After generating the first signature, if we detected any
new exploit that is not blocked by the signature, we do the same vulnerability diagnosis. If
they reach the same vulnerability point, we know they are exploring a different execution
path. We combine the new signature results with the previous signature results as a new
signature. Using the above input analysis approach, we can achieve generating signatures
with zero-false positives and zero-false negatives.
8.3 EXPLOIT GENERATION
Automatic patch-based exploit generation (APEG) is first proposed in[25]. I contribute
on the statistic criteria for the binary differences of two given binary programs and I also
contribute on some of the experiments on that APEG work. I summarize this APEG work
briefly here. For details, please refer to paper[25]. Similarly by checking the safety of the
data copy procedures in the updated functions of the two binary programs, we can use the
BOVD results to help generating exploits for buffer overflow vulnerabilities. This is discussed
in Section 8.3.3 briefly.
Automatic exploit generation can be used by attackers. It is also useful for security
practitioners, e.g. prioritizing the bug fixes.
In paper[25], we show that given a program P and a patched version of the program P ′,
we can automatically generate an exploit for input validation vulnerabilities present in P
but fixed in P ′. We call this automatic patch-based exploit generation(APEG). We present
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techniques which work on binary programs and libraries, thus are applicable to binary-only
patch distribution schemes.
8.3.1 Binary Diffs
To isolate what changes have occurred between P and P’, security practitioners have devel-
oped tools, such as bindiff[79] and EBDS[45], which first disassemble both P and P’, and
then identify which assembly instructions have changed.
When the difference between a given vulnerable binary program and the patched binary
program is small, we can generate the exploits efficiently. So we need a criterion to define
the distance between the given pair of binary programs. For those that have small distance,
we will apply our following approaches to generate exploits. Others, we simply disregard
them.
Using EBDS[45], we can obtain the number of blocks and the match rate for each func-
tion of the experimented two binary programs. Given these information, we can apply the
Kullback-Leibler Divergence (K-L Divergence)[10] to define the distance of the given two
binaries. A similar entropy based approach is used to evaluate the communication pre-
dictability in parallel applications[57].
We will explain the K-L Divergence concept briefly and how it can be applied to our
problem in the following.
How to Apply K-L Divergence to Solve Our Problem
K-L Divergence is a measure of the difference between two distributions P and Q in
information theory[10]. The formula below defines the K-L distance of Q from P and i
represents each item enumeration in the distribution.
DKL(P ||Q) =
∑
i
P (i)log
P (i)
Q(i)
= −
∑
i
P (i)log
Q(i)
P (i)
(8.1)
Applying K-L Divergence to solve our problem is straight-forward. The i is for each
function in the binaries. For each function, we have the match rate of it from EBDS[45],
which is exactly the Q(i)
P (i)
. The match rate represents the degree of the similarity of that
function in the two binaries. It is between 0 and 1. The higher the value is, the less changes
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Table 15: Binary Distance Example I
Function Name Number of Blocks Match Rate
f1 10 0.8
f2 60 0.9
f3 15 1
f4 5 1
f5 10 1
the function has been done. For functions that are the same in the two binaries, the match
rate will be 1. The P (i) can be calculated using the number of blocks information. The
equation to calculate P (i) is given below where the Block(i) represents the number of blocks
in function i and j is an enumeration of all the functions in the binary programs:
P (i) =
Block(i)∑
j Block(j)
(8.2)
Combining equations (8.1, 8.2) and the match rate information, we can get our equation
to evaluate the distance of given two binaries:
Dbinary pair(B1||B2) = −
∑
i
Block(i)∑
j Block(j)
log(MatchRate(i)) (8.3)
Experiments
We are going to show you some examples to apply equation 8.3 to calculate the distance
of two binaries.
By applying equation 8.3, we can calculate the distance between these two binaries as
Dbinary pair(B1||B2) = −(
10
10 + 60 + 15 + 5 + 10
log(0.8)+
60
10 + 60 + 15 + 5 + 10
log(0.9)) = 0.0372
(8.4)
By applying equation 8.3, we can calculate the distance between these two binaries as
Dbinary pair(B1||B2) = −(
10
10 + 60 + 15 + 5 + 10
log(0.3)+
60
10 + 60 + 15 + 5 + 10
log(0.2)) = 0.4717
(8.5)
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Table 16: Binary Distance Example II
Function Name Number of Blocks Match Rate
f1 10 0.3
f2 60 0.2
f3 15 1
f4 5 1
f5 10 1
From the above simple examples we can conclude that the larger the distance is, the
more different the two binaries are. when the given two binaries are the same, the distance
will be zero.
In Section 8.3.2 and Section 8.3.3, we will describe two approaches towards automatic
patch generation. The Approach I, APEG presented in paper[25], is designed especially for
input validation vulnerabilities. The Approach II is for buffer overflow vulnerabilities using
our vulnerability diagnosis results.
8.3.2 Approach I
In this approach, we focus on input validation vulnerabilities where user input is not suffi-
ciently sanitized in P , but is sanitized via new checks in P ′. Many common vulnerabilities
are input validation vulnerabilities which are fixed by adding input sanitization logic.
This APEG approach towards automatic patch-based exploit generation is based on the
observation that the new sanitization checks added to P ′ often 1) identify the vulnerability
point where the vulnerability occurs, and 2) indicate the conditions under which we can
exploit P .
Thus, the steps to this approach are:
1. Identify the new sanitization checks added in P ′. The remaining steps are performed for
each new check individually.
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2. Generate a candidate exploit x which fails the new check in P ′ by:
a. Calculating the weakest precondition to fail the new check in P ′. The result is the
constraint formula F . We present three approaches for generating the constraint
formula target this problem: dynamic approach, static approach and combination of
dynamic and static approach.
b. Use a solver to find x such that F(x) = true. x is the candidate exploit.
3. Verify a candidate exploit is a real exploit by running φ(P (x)).
4. If desired, we can generate polymorphic variants. Let x be a known exploit. Let F ′(X) =
F(X) ∧ (X <> x). Then x′ such that F ′(x′) = true is a polymorphic variant exploit
candidate. This process can be repeated to enumerate polymorphic variants.
In paper[25], we demonstrate that automatic patch-based exploit generation is practical
for real-life patched vulnerabilities.
8.3.3 Approach II
The APEG proposed in Section 8.3.2 is targeted on input validation vulnerabilities. The
results are also limited by incorrect loop unrolling and indeterminacy of recursive function
call during the step of calculating the weakest precondition. Also, when the constraint
formula is too complicated, the constraint solver may take forever to get the solution. For
example, MS05018 addresses a stack buffer overflow vulnerability. The patched version of
the program updated the wcscpy to wcsncpy. It can’t be handled using Approach I as it is
not an input validation vulnerability.
However, using this thesis vulnerability diagnosis results, we can do the APEG for some
cases that can’t be handled by approach I. The steps to Approach II are similar to Approach I.
However, it changes identifying the new sanitization checks using the weakest precondition
to identifying each data copy procedure in the updated functions using the vulnerability
diagnosis approach. The steps to this approach are:
1. Identify each data copy procedure in P that appears in the updated functions between
P and P ′. The data copy procedure includes known standard C library functions or
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system functions that perform data coping functionality and results by applying the
loop analysis step. The remaining steps are performed for each data copy procedure.
2. Generate some random inputs. The remaining steps are performed for each random
input.
a. Collect the runtime traces by running the input.
b. Check the data copy procedure. If it appears in the run time traces, perform the
bound analysis to see the bound results of the destination buffer and to see if some
input variables can control the data copy procedure or the destination buffer size.
c. If some input variables can control the data copy procedure or the destination buffer
size, perform input analysis step to see how the inputs are related with those vari-
ables.
d. Generate exploits based on the bound analysis results and input analysis results.
Because we know the bound results of the destination buffer and how the user inputs
control the data copying procedure, we can generate exploits that can cause hi-jack
control attacks more easily than Approach I.
e. Verify a candidate exploit is a real exploit by running φ(P (x)).
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS
A buffer overflow occurs when a store instruction writes outside the allocated buffer bounds.
In the best case, a buffer overflow results in the program crashing due to an inappropriate
memory dereference. In the worst case, a buffer overflow can be exploited to hijack control
of a program. The existence of buffer overflow vulnerabilities makes the system susceptible
to Internet worms and denial of service (DDoS) attacks which can cause huge social and
financial impacts.
Due to its importance, buffer overflow problem has been intensively studied since its
emergence. However, automatic BOVD is still an open problem. It is a big gap of software
security research. Currently, the vulnerability diagnosis is done manually by security engi-
neers. It is an error-prone activity requiring heavy investment in time and manpower which
often delays the protection time, e.g. patch generation time.
This thesis defines the automatic BOVD problem and provides solutions towards auto-
matic BOVD for commodity software. It targets on commodity software when source code
and symbol table are not available because the binary code is ubiquitous and the binary
code is high fidelity important to the security problem even though it is much more difficult
to analyze binary code.
The automatic BOVD problem is: given a buffer overflow vulnerable program P and
a working exploit E, we want to automatically and accurately find out where the program
is vulnerable, buffer overflow vulnerability point (BOVP) and figure out why the program
is vulnerable, buffer overflow vulnerability condition (BOVC). Since buffer overflow attack
occurs by overwriting the security critical data, for example, return address, function pointer
etc. We use the instruction that does the malicious write to pinpoint the vulnerability
location of the given vulnerable program. The BOVC contains the destination buffer size
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information, the total number of writes information and how the user inputs are related with
them. The above BOVC results assume the buffer overflow happens through a data copy
procedure. This thesis can also identify the case when the buffer overflow attack happens
through an unchecked array index instead of a data copy procedure.
The solutions combine both of the dynamic analysis techniques and static analysis tech-
niques to achieve the goal. It extends the existing dynamic-taint-analysis attack detection
tool to do the BOVP detection and performs three steps analysis towards understanding
BOVC. The BOVP is achieved by searching back the trace for the latest instruction that
overwrites the security critical data after the attack detection.
Based on the observation that buffer overflow attack happens when the size of the des-
tination buffer is smaller than the total number of writes after the data copying process if
the buffer overflow attack happens through a data copy procedure, the three steps analysis
towards understanding the BOVC include loop analysis, bound analysis and input analysis.
The bound analysis answers the size of the destination buffer information. The loop anal-
ysis answers the total number of writes information of programmer implemented data copy
procedure. For buffer overflow attack happens through standard C library functions (library
data copy procedures), we answer the total number of writes information trough function
summaries. The input analysis answers how the user inputs are related with the size of the
destination buffer and the total number of writes.
Our loop analysis is based on the observation that most of the real world buffer overflow
attacks happen through loop context. We use loop detection to locate a programmer imple-
mented data copy procedure and we propose a generalized data copy procedure and apply
loop analysis on it to answer the total number of writes question.
Our bound analysis is achieved through memory traces analysis. This is based on the
observation that our runtime traces contain all of the memory update information. Because
we can overwrite those variables that have not been written, we can guarantee the fine-
grained bound result for the given execution path. Also, because our bound analysis is
independent of the location of the vulnerable buffer, we can handle the buffer overflow that
happens anywhere including stack, heap, Data/BSS.
Our input analysis generates the dynamic slicing of the traces contains the malicious
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variable(s) and performs symbolic execution on it to answer how the user inputs are related
with those malicious variable(s).
The automatic BOVD has many applications including automatic patch generation, au-
tomatic signature generation, automatic exploit generation, and the assistance for the se-
curity engineers to understand the vulnerability condition easier and faster. This thesis
also discusses how to generate signatures with zero-false positives and zero-false negatives
by combining with other research work. Real world vulnerable applications including the
buffer overflow vulnerabilities targeted by the record-setting Slammer and Blaster worms are
studied. The automatic diagnosis results on those programs demonstrate the effective of this
thesis work’s approach.
Furthermore, this thesis also does the buffer overflow vulnerability case study. This case
study result can have independent interests to researchers. This is because of the lack of
previous research on this problem. Researchers use their own heuristic when they design
attack response systems or debugging tools. This makes the current research solutions far
from satisfaction. Our buffer overflow case study results can help the other researchers to
design more effective response systems and debugging tools against buffer overflow attacks.
In summary, this thesis makes the following contributions to software security research:
• It combines both of the static binary program analysis techniques and dynamic taint
analysis techniques to provide solutions towards automatic BOVD. It extends the existing
dynamic-taint-analysis attack detection tool to do the BOVP detection and performs
three steps analysis towards understanding BOVC. The three steps are loop analysis,
bound analysis and input analysis.
• It uses loop analysis to understand programmer written data copy procedures under
reasonable loop heuristic assumptions. This is based on the observation of all known
buffer overflow attacks that most of them take place in loop context.
• It achieves fine-grained bound analysis result of the vulnerable buffer using novel memory
trace analysis approach. This can be achieved based on the fact that the runtime traces
contain all of the memory operation history. This memory operation includes function
call, function return, variable push and pop, variable load and store, malloc, free etc.
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• It performs buffer overflow vulnerability case study which may have independent interests
to security engineers. There are six basic buffer overflow vulnerability cases that cover
all of the real world vulnerable applications I studied. Other theoretically possible cases
are also discussed. This result can help other researchers to design more effective defense
systems.
88
APPENDIX
RUNNING EXAMPLES
89
struct Data{char data[36]; int tag;}
void process(int count, char* source){
struct Data *chunk;
int i, tmp;
tmp = sizeof(struct Data);
chunk = (struct Data *)malloc(tmp);
chunk -> tag = 1;
for (i=0; i<count; i++)
chunk -> data[i++] = *source++;
}
void main() {
char name[65], pass[65], buffer[1024];
int count, socket;
...
n = read(socket, name, 64);
n = read(socket, pass, 64);
n = read(socket, &count, 4);
...
sprintf(buffer, "\%s \%s", name, pass);
process(count, buffer);
}
Figure 23: The running example of buffer overflow vulnerable program.
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struct Data{char data[36]; int tag;}
void process(char* source){
struct Data *chunk;
int i, tmp;
tmp = sizeof(struct Data);
chunk = (struct Data *)malloc(tmp);
chunk -> tag = 1;
strcpy(chunk->data, source);
}
void main() {
char name[65], pass[65], buffer[1024];
int socket;
...
n = read(socket, name, 64);
n = read(socket, pass, 64);
...
sprintf(buffer, "\%s \%s", name, pass);
process(buffer);
}
Figure 24: Buffer Overflow Cases: Case I
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void process(int size, char* source){
char *chunk;
chunk = (char *)malloc(size);
strcpy(chunk, source);
}
void main() {
char name[65], pass[65], buffer[128];
int size, socket;
...
n = read(socket, name, 64);
n = read(socket, pass, 64);
n = read(socket, &size, 4);
...
snprintf(buffer, 127, "\%s \%s", name, pass);
process(size, buffer);
}
Figure 25: Buffer Overflow Cases: Case II
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void process(int size, char* source){
char *chunk;
chunk = (char *)malloc(size);
strcpy(chunk, source);
}
void main() {
char name[65], pass[65], buffer[1024];
int count, socket;
...
n = read(socket, name, 64);
n = read(socket, pass, 64);
n = read(socket, &count, 4);
...
sprintf(buffer, "\%s \%s", name, pass);
process(count, buffer);
}
Figure 26: Buffer Overflow Cases: Case III
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struct ANIChunk{
char tag[4];
DWORD size;
char data[size];
}
struct ANIHeader{
char data[36];
}
int LoadAniIcon(struct MappedFile* file, ...){
struct ANIChunk chunk;
struct ANIHeader header;
...
while(1){
// read the chunk data from file.
ReadTag(file, &chunk);
switch(chunk.tag){
case ’seq’:
...
case ’anih’:
memcpy(&header, chunk.data, chunk.size);
}
}
}
Figure 27: Buffer Overflow Cases: Case IV, motivated by ANI(MS07017)
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int read_header(int sid){
char line[2048];
...
sgets(line, sizeof(line)-1, conn[sid].socket);
...
conn[sid].dat->in_ContenctLength = atoi((char *)&line+16);
...
conn[sid].PostData = calloc(conn[sid].dat->in_ContenctLength + 1024, sizeof(char));
...
rc = recv(conn[sid].socket, conn[sid].PostData, 1024, 0);
...
}
Figure 28: Buffer Overflow Cases: Case V, motivated by nullhttpd
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struct PLTEChunk{
DWORD PLTEentry;
char PLTEdata[PLTEentry];
}
struct TRNSChunk{
DWORD TRNSsize;
char TRNSdata[TRNSsize];
}
void processTRNS(struct MappedFile* file, ...){
struct PLTEChunk pChunk;
struct TRNSChunk tChunk;
...
// read the PLTE chunk data from file.
ReadPLTEData(file, &pChunk);
...
// read the TRNS chunk data from file.
ReadTRNSData(file, &tChunk);
for (i = 0; i < tChunk.TRNSsize; i++){
updatePLTEentry(pChunk.PLTEdata[i], tChunk.TRNSdata[i]);
}
}
Figure 29: Buffer Overflow Cases: Case VI, motivated by PNG(MS05025)
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void process(int size, char* source){
char chunk[36];
for (int i = 0; i < size && source[i] != ’0’; i++){
chunk[i] = *source++;
}
}
void main() {
char name[65], pass[65], buffer[1024];
int count, socket;
...
n = read(socket, name, 64);
n = read(socket, pass, 64);
n = read(socket, &count, 4);
...
sprintf(buffer, "\%s \%s", name, pass);
process(count, buffer);
}
Figure 30: Buffer Overflow Cases: Other Cases (Multiple Loop Exit Conditions)
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void process(int offset, char* source){
char chunk[36];
for(int i = 0; i < 36; i++){
chunk[offset + i] = source[i];
}
}
void main() {
char name[65], pass[65], buffer[1024];
int offset, socket;
...
n = read(socket, name, 64);
n = read(socket, pass, 64);
n = read(socket, &offset, 4);
...
sprintf(buffer, "\%s \%s", name, pass);
process(offset, buffer);
}
Figure 31: Buffer Overflow Cases: Other Cases (startOffset variable in Equation 3.3 can be
controlled by user input)
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void process(int index){
char chunk[36];
chunk[index] = ’H’;
}
void main() {
int index, socket;
...
n = read(socket, &index, 4);
...
process(index);
}
Figure 32: Buffer Overflow Cases: Other Cases (Malicious Array Index)
Figure 33: Buffer Overflow Cases: Other Cases (Other Loop Bound)
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